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Daily Report
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FBIS-EEU-96-115 *13 June 1996*

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Balkans: New Deadline Set for Signing of Disarmament Pact

LD1206164196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1326 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Oslo, June 12 (TANJUG)—Federal Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic and the members of the Yugoslav delegation left Oslo for Belgrade on Wednesday.

A delegation of the (Bosnian Serb) Republika Srpska, headed by Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha, left Oslo on the same flight.

Both delegations were in Oslo to take part in a meeting which was to have resulted in the signing of an agreement on arms cuts in former Yugoslavia.

An agreement in principle on this had been reached in Vienna at talks over the past five months, but the Muslim government delegation from Sarajevo on Wednesday refused to sign the agreement.

Oslo talks mediator, Norwegian Gen. Vigleik Eide named June 20 as a possible new deadline for signing this agreement.

Balkans: ICRC Urges Pressure Over Missing Persons

AU1206135796 Paris AFP in English 1341 GNT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, June 12 (AFP)—The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) will call for pressure to help resolve the issue of missing people at this week's conference on Bosnia in Florence, officials said Wednesday.

ICRC officials told reporters here that over 12,000 cases of missing people had been reported in Bosnia alone. They said there had been "no significant progress" on the issue.

"We must demand from the warring parties that they give information that we know is available," ICRC official Alex Braunwalder said.

Braunwalder said that resolving the issue of the missing was vital for the successful reintegration of Eastern Slavonia, the last Serb-held part of Croatia.

He accused Belgrade of withholding information on the missing from the eastern Croatian town of Vukovar, captured by Serbs in 1991, while Croatia, he said, had information on people missing in the two military campaigns of 1995.

"In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, there can be no genuine climate of peace, stability and normalisation of relations until this issue is resolved," he said.

He said that the organisation's president, Cornelio Sommaruga, would raise the subject at the international conference on Bosnia to be held in the Italian city on Thursday and Friday.

"This is not just a humanitarian issue," he said. "We will tell the Contact Group that this is essential for peace, stability and the normalisation of relations."

"The parties must be faced with their responsibilities. Then it is up to the Contact Group to exert pressure to have the parties comply," Braunwalder said.

Under the terms of the Dayton agreement, the parties concerned have to provide information about missing people.

The press conference was to launch a new campaign to gather information about the missing in Bosnia. It aims to persuade relatives of missing people to file tracing requests with the ICRC if they have not already done so and to persuade people with any information to report it.

Similar press conferences were being held in Sarajevo, Belgrade, Mostar, Banja Luka, and Geneva.

"Tracing the missing in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the ICRC's topmost priority right now," Braunwalder said.

ICRC official Francisco Villar Otero said that of the 12,167 cases of missing people which had been reported in Bosnia, 175 had been resolved since March this year.

"It is going slowly," he told AFP.

He said that 8,794 cases had been submitted to a working group on the issue, of which 7,925 were Bosnian Moslems, 194 Bosnian Croats and 593 Bosnian Serbs. There were 82 cases of people from other communities or nationalities.

He said that most of the requests for information had been sent to the Bosnian Serb authorities—8,012, while 322 had been sent to the Bosnian Croats and 460 to the Bosnian government authorities.

The campaign involves the publication of the names of missing people in book form and on the Internet. The thick, shiny book lists names, sex, date and place of birth, father's name and date and place of disappearance. Flicking through it, the word Srebrenica appears again and again.

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The former UN-protected area of Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia was captured by Bosnian Serbs in July 1995. Villar Otero said that 5,911 cases of missing people had been reported from there.

In Croatia, Villar Otero said that the ICRC was being asked to trace 2,400 people from the fighting in 1991 and 1992 while a further 500 requests had been submitted for people missing from Operations Flash and Storm last year when the Croatian army recaptured most of the Serb-held territory.

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Albania: Berisha Views Criticism of Parliamentary Elections

AU1206192696 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 12 Jun 96 p 3

[Interview with Albanian President Sali Berisha by Norbert Mappes-Niediek; place and date not given: "I Do Not Accept Irregularities"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Mappes-Niediek] Have other heads of state congratulated you on the elections?

[Berisha] My friends have congratulated, while others are still waiting. I am very realistic. I will meet with them and tell them what is really true and what is not true. For a journalist it is not easy to understand Albania. Some reported what they saw, others staged their reports. I deplore this very much. These are not free people.

[Mappes-Niediek] The statements have been generally negative. The State Department called the elections a "step backward" and the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] chairman recommended partial new elections.

[Berisha] I am deeply determined to repeat the elections everywhere where there were irregularities. I do not accept irregularities. Even if the international community says that the elections have been free and fair, this has to be checked. The opposition backed out three hours before the closure of the polling stations. This is unique in the history of elections in democratic countries. I have not even read a pretext for it.

[Mappes-Niediek] It was because of the election irregularities.

[Berisha] Excuse me! They have to present facts! They have none, they want to invent some! There were 400 observers and journalists, and none of them has presented any proof of serious incidents that could serve as a pretext for the boycott. None of them!

[Mappes-Niediek] There are reports.

[Berisha] Why didn't the opposition decide to withdraw one day earlier? Because at that time it still hoped for the protocols that it had distributed everywhere in Albania, with which it wanted to proclaim their false victory! We have documents! They withdrew their people with the slogan: "We have to get out of it because we have lost heavily!" That was Mr. Ruci, secretary general of the Socialist Party. I am deeply convinced that the West and really everyone will recognize the correctness of these elections.

[Mappes-Niediek] Who is to investigate the irregularities? Do you accept an international court of arbitration?

[Berisha] The Central Investigation Commission will investigate, that is, according to the principle "in dubio pro reo." And after the commission, there is still the Constitutional Court.

[Mappes-Niediek] The opposition thinks that the Central Election Commission is biased.

[Berisha] Even the EU called on us to check according to the Albanian laws. Everything that is concrete will be checked. He who generalizes wants to accuse, not to identify mistakes. Concretely, first, second, third! We will show that we have nothing to hide.

[Mappes-Niediek] The opposition wants general new elections, but it would have accepted partial new elections if it is to be a test of whether the first elections were correct. Is a compromise close at hand?

[Berisha] No. The elections will not be repeated, this is certain. This is a matter of this country's sovereignty. Nobody must touch it.

[Mappes-Niediek] But if the by-elections on Sunday [16 June] produce a completely different result?

[Berisha] By-elections are not a test at all, and they also are not accepted as such. In the meantime, there may have been shifts to our or to their advantage. Every election expert can confirm that. We also had a second round of elections. It worked very well, and the result was to their disadvantage. I have invited them: Please, send the observed irregularities to the election commission! Many parties have done that.

[Mappes-Niediek] The atmosphere in the country is at any rate tense. How can this polarization be overcome?

[Berisha] We are offering a permanent dialogue. That is our way. However, they are in disagreement—this will soon turn out to be the case. There are very fundamentalist people, like the former secret police minister, and one who got his doctor's degree in Marxism in Moscow. Others, however, belong to the future Social Democrats, and we are very open to them.

[Mappes-Niediek] Can you do something as the president to overcome the polarization?

[Berisha] Not in a few days; that is not possible. I am deeply convinced that a new era has begun for Albania, a far better and quieter one. There is a strong basis for a democratic left. Indeed, the history of the left in Albania is very honorable in some respects. Politburo members lost their lives because they wanted Albania to orient itself by the West. In their convictions they were social democrats, and they are not few!

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[Mappes-Niediek] However, the Social Democrats exist, they are as they are, and they are above all the strongest opposition party.

[Berisha] This will change very quickly. They will split up. There are people who did not persecute anyone; I am very convinced of their morals.

[Mappes-Niediek] Where is a dialogue possible?

[Berisha] Everywhere. In the past four years, however, I had many round-table discussions with them, although it was always said that such a thing had not taken place here. Again and again, they denied the consensus that we had achieved there. I said: Let us agree on the human rights charter and capital punishment. On the next day it was said: We never agreed.

[Mappes-Niediek] You exposed yourself very much in the election campaign. Would it not have been better if you had tried to bring about a national consensus?

[Berisha] I was elected by the parliament; things are a little bit different from the situation in your country. Four years ago I was the party chairman and presented the people with a program that we have fulfilled point by point. I am very proud and very happy. I asked the people: Where is the point that we have not fulfilled? We are sincere, we have done what we said. Perhaps I would have done it in a different way if Ruci had not been on the other side.

[Mappes-Niediek] Do you expect the newly elected Albanian parliament to adopt a new constitution?

[Berisha] The new parliament will certainly adopt a new constitution.

[Mappes-Niediek] Will it strengthen the role of the president?

[Berisha] Absolutely not.

[Mappes-Niediek] Will there be a direct election of the president?

[Berisha] No. I have two-thirds and do not want a presidential system. I am really against it. We have to develop a parliamentary tradition.

[Mappes-Niediek] What will the political landscape be like in 10 years?

[Berisha] Then there will be two alternative options: right of center and left of center. The alternatives that Europe has developed will also be developed by us in Albania.

Albania: Defense Minister Receives Turkish Military Delegation

AU1206082896 Tirana ATA in English 1636 GMT 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 11 (ATA)—A military delegation of Turkish medicine, headed by the commander of the Turkish Army Military Center, Division General Fahredin Alpasan, is on a four day visit to Albania.

The delegation was received by Defence Minister Safet Zhulali who thanked the delegation for Turkish aid to the Albanian Army in various fields including logistics, education and qualification of the Albanian military. He also thanked them for the doubling of the number, from 30 to 60, of the Albanians to be cured in Turkey.

The delegation will also visit the Army Central Hospital and the University Center in Tirana.

The delegation was also received by the chief of the Army General Staff, Sheme Kosova.

Albania: Press Views Milosevic DER SPIEGEL Interview

AU1306102796 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 12 Jun 96 p 2

[Commentary by M. Mesini: "Arguments Against Milosevic's 'Arguments'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is been noticed, no doubt not accidentally, that Kosova and the Albanians have recently been increasingly prominent in Serbian mass media, discussions of the Serbian Academy of Sciences, and in public and political life. Kosova is again a "hot topic" on the Serbian political scene. Serbian President Milosevic himself spoke about the Albanians a few days ago in an interview in the authoritative German magazine DER SPIEGEL. Obliged against his will to talk about Kosova, he spoke in a familiar vein, producing "arguments" out of familiar Serbian desk drawers and scenarios that have never borne any relation to the truth and the real arguments with which the entire world is now familiar. Milosevic, the Serbian president brought to power with the unstinted help of the "Serbian myth of Kosovo," knows where the viper has its sting and did not allow himself and the Serbian people to be confronted with the indisputable truth about Kosova and the Albanians, who are an incontestable majority in their own ethnic territories. Asked by the German journalist, "whether Belgrade is ready to allow Kosova a higher degree of democratic self-determination," Milosevic answered, "I do not think that any minority anywhere in the world enjoys so many rights as the Albanian minority in Serbia. The

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Albanians have their own educational system, their radio and television programs, and at least 20 newspapers and magazines, which are very critical. In one of them, I was even portrayed as a dog, but no publication has ever been forbidden. The Albanians among us are free and live in a free state."

Thus spake Milosevic. Avoiding a direct answer, Milosevic hastens to assert things that are not in any sense true. Having no facts on his own side, Milosevic calls on the aid of entirely fanciful arguments. First, he calls a "minority" a nation of 2 million indigenous inhabitants that have lived on their own territories for centuries, and even dares to assert that "this minority enjoys more rights than any other in the world." The Germans, with their subtle political instincts, appear to have quite consciously published Milosevic's parrot-talk, in the belief that lies thrown in the world's face quickly rebound on those who utter them. Now even the sparrows know that Kosova is a state occupied and placed under siege by Serbia. The Milosevic regime took away with tanks and force even the autonomy that it had enjoyed until 1989. This fact is a genuine one, and the political fantasies of the Serbian president do not at all hold water.

What school system the Albanians possess they defend as far as they can against the unprecedented pressure of the regime headed by Milosevic. The Albanians have created this system themselves because they could not allow almost 500,000 Albanian schoolchildren to study under the curricula imposed by the Serbs, as Serbia wished. No way. But they did not receive their school system as a "gift" from Milosevic. On the contrary, these schoolchildren were ejected from school premises and their teachers were beaten, crippled, and faced with incessant police persecution precisely because they stood up for the school system which now Milosevic says is "their own." Who learns in the school buildings built by the people of Kosova? Why does the Serbian president lie in front of German journalists and the European public?

Meanwhile, as for the radio, the television, and "the 20 newspapers and magazines that the Albanians have," there is again no need to waste many words to dismiss Milosevic's "arguments" like a soap bubble. Prishtina Television was attacked by the first police expedition in 1990, and the Albanian staff were thrown out of the studios into the yard by police clubs, like in countries ruled by savage military juntas. In July of the same year, RILINDJA was occupied. The paper was forbidden on 7 August and never allowed to appear again. Is this what Milosevic calls press freedom for the Albanians? The semi-Albanian program that remains on the radio and television does not belong to the Albanians, but is a propaganda farce of the two-faced Serbian regime that is supposedly attempting to promote "equality of information" in Kosova.

The information network in Kosova, like the state of Kosova itself, is under occupation and those newspapers that are published, and which Milosevic mentioned in his interview, are not 20. There is one daily, which with great difficulty barely survives under occupation, and there are several magazines published with private funds, and which fare no better under the harassment and persecution of the Serbian regime. Many magazines have been forbidden.

It is sometimes not worth entering into argument with public lies. However, seeing that they are in mass production in the mouths of Serbian politicians, and this time come from Milosevic himself, let us tell Mr. Milosevic that it is incontrovertible that the Albanians are not free, but are being held under occupation together with their state of Kosova. It is always hopeless to play the trumpet into deaf ears, but let us say that the Albanians do not consider Serbia to be their state, regardless of what Milosevic might wish. They know the taste of the freedom that "this state" might offer them, and the truth is that they do not like it.

When he replies to the German journalists' introductory remarks that "the Albanians in Kosova are not a minority but a majority," Milosevic grasps at straws in order not to drown in the whirlpool of lies that he himself has stirred up, and says, "The Albanians in Yugoslavia are doubtless a minority. The Mexicans living in southern Texas might call for union with Mexico. This is our business, and the issue of Kosova will not in any way become an international one."

If Milosevic were pressed on this matter, the Albanians would not exist at all, let alone in Kosova. He bases his argument on a comparison with the Mexicans in southern Texas, and says, "No, this is our business." Of course, Milosevic has become extremely irritated that Kosova, without his being asked, has become not an internal matter of Serbia, as he hysterically wails, but is an "international problem, of such international interest as to demand an appropriate political solution."

By talking in this way about Kosova, the Serbian president tries to close the subject by making it "Serbia's internal affair," and trying to deny that it "has become an international issue." However, he himself will not avoid having to face up to a solution.

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Albania: 'Upsurge' Noted in Illegal Emigration to Italy

AU1106093196 Tirana ATA in English 1131 GMT 9 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana (dpa) [dateline as received]—High summer temperatures and calm seas are behind a recent upsurge in the number of Albanian clandestines trying to reach the Italian coast by boat, according to Albanian newspaper reports on Sunday.

People are reportedly coming from all over the country to the southwestern Albanian port of Vlora, from where boat traffickers can whisk them to Italy's southern coast in less than two hours.

The price for the passage has now increased to 1,500 dollars including the promise of a black labour job for every illegal. If caught by the Italian police and deported, the clandestine is offered a second free trip.

In the last five years Albanian police have in vain tried to stop the traffic, which is reportedly in the hands of an Albanian-Italian mafia and is used not only for the passage of clandestines but also for the transfer of drugs and other smuggled goods.

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Bulgaria: Croatia To Send Observer to Balkan Conference

AU1106104796 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 11 Jun 96 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Croatia To Attend Sofia Meeting as Observer"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Croatia will attend the Sofia meeting of the foreign ministers of southeastern Europe as an observer, Foreign Ministry spokesman Pantaley Karasimeonov announced yesterday. At the moment, consultations are being held with the countries in the region on new dates for the meeting at the end or June or beginning of July. Croatia first declined to attend the meeting, but after new dates are agreed that are acceptable to all the states taking part, Zagreb will send observers to the meeting.

Bulgaria: Zimbabwean President Visits Sofia

MB0906205896 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1952 GMT 09 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SOFIA June 9 SAPA—Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe on Sunday arrived in the Bulgarian capital Sofia at the start of an eastern European tour which would also take him to Romania and Yugoslavia, the news agency Ziana reported.

Mugabe, accompanied by Foreign Affairs Minister Stan Mudenge and several government officials, was met at Sofia International Airport by Bulgarian Deputy Foreign Minister Ivan Khristov.

On arrival, he held talks with President Zhelyu Zhelev of Bulgaria, which focused on bilateral and economic relations.

After the meeting, Mugabe told journalists they had agreed there was a need for the two countries to "move together" in trade and joint ventures. The president said he expected to adjust and strengthen several bilateral agreements between the two countries on economic reforms.

While links between Zimbabwe and Bulgaria were established during the former's struggle against colonialism, economic and trade relations between them had not been as strong, despite the signing of several agreements in the 1980s.

Bulgarian charge d'affaires to Zimbabwe, Delcho Iliev, said the trade volume between the two countries worried them. Bulgaria was interested in Zimbabwe tobacco, cotton and coal, while the southern African nation could benefit from Bulgaria's construction industry.

Bulgaria: Pirinski Said Planning Visit to Turkey

AU1106122796 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 11 Jun 96 p 5

[Article by Lyudmila Zasheva: "Pirinski's Visit to Turkey Kept Secret"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A very well informed source has told STANDART NEWS that Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski will make an official visit to Turkey, probably in July. The date has not yet been arranged, so the visit is not being announced officially.

However, there is another reason to withhold the news for the time being, the source claims. The Left has not yet decided who will be its presidential candidate. The opening of Bulgarian diplomacy toward Ankara will be interpreted at BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] headquarters as a mark of respect to the West and as a betrayal of the Socialist cabinet's unofficial Orthodox orientation. Thus, Pirinski might lose some of his chances of being nominated to run for president. On the other hand, the warming of relations with our neighbors will be a strong trump card in the hands of an already nominated candidate. In any case, the long-suffering population will prefer a man for president who follows a moderate and equally balanced policy toward all neighboring countries.

Exactly a year ago, former Turkish Foreign Minister Erdal Inonyu visited our country. At the time, he invited his Bulgarian counterpart to make a return visit. However, Pirinski answered in the affirmative only about two months ago, when the all-Balkan meeting was first mooted. He accepted the invitation with the aim of predisposing Turkey to attend and it is now clear that he succeeded. Although Ankara has declined the dates of 8 and 9 June, it agreed to participate at a later date.

Now the chief Bulgarian diplomat is awaiting the decision of BSP headquarters regarding the presidential candidature before announcing the precise date of his visit.

Bulgaria: Cabinet Wins Confidence Vote in Assembly

AU1306082996 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0800 GMT 13 Jun 96

[Report by Vanya Manolova from National Assembly in Sofia—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] Here is our reporter Vanya Manolova, who will summarize the results of the no-confidence vote in the government that was completed a short time ago.

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[Manolova] The Zhan Videnov government has received the confidence of the 37th National Assembly. The secret ballot and counting of the votes was completed comparatively quickly, in about an hour and a half. A total of 235 deputies cast their votes in the ballot, of whom 99 supported the no-confidence motion, while 135 voted against it, indicating their support of Zhan Videnov and his government. In view of the fact that there are 125 deputies in the Democratic Left parliamentary group, we may draw the conclusion that at least 10 deputies from other parliamentary groups cast their votes for Zhan Videnov and the government. One ballot paper envelope was found to be empty.

After the announcement of the result of the vote, Prime Minister Zhan Videnov thanked the deputies for showing confidence in him. He stressed that as a nation, we should have started implementing the unpopular but essential measures much earlier. He promised a new economic policy and [words indistinct].

Bulgaria: Editorial Says Cabinet Has Lost People's Vote

AU1206141596 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 12 Jun 96 p 3

[Commentary by Petya Vladimirova: "The Vote Has Already Been Cast"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In parliament tomorrow, the deputies will have to vote according to their own consciences in deciding whether to allow the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] government to continue to rule the country, and whether to allow it to continue to rule in the same way. Are Bulgarian citizens, already driven into penury, to be given some hope of survival? Or are they to be finally turned into a penniless riffraff who do not pay their taxes or electricity bills so that they can buy their daily bread, when it is available? During yesterday's debates on the opposition's no-confidence motion in the government, we did not hear a single word from the left that showed any understanding for the dilemma that faces not merely individual sections of the population, but millions of Bulgarians. This problem has been caused not by "the objective course of the transition," but by the majority that in practice has been governing Bulgaria since 1993.

Instead of offering arguments to prove the adequacy of their own economic policies, the BSP speakers yesterday, as always, used the television cameras to broadcast their primitive propaganda theses that the SDS is responsible for the failure of their administration.

We could have expected nothing else. Again, millions of Bulgarians saw their faces on the front benches. Occasionally their stony countenances were disturbed by a fleeting expression of inner discomfort. However, these were not signs of pangs of conscience in the face of the facts, but signs of poorly concealed fury at being caught like criminals in the act.

Tomorrow they will reject the no-confidence motion and march in rank by rank to cast their votes in support of Zhan Videnov's government, even though they may attack him and find fault at their plenums and midnight gatherings. However, their strength is already an illusion, because tomorrow's vote in the hall of parliament will be far different from that other vote that every Bulgarian home has been casting daily for months past. According to a public opinion poll conducted by MBMD [expansion unknown], support for Zhan Videnov's government has slumped to 22.0 percent, while 62.2 percent of the people are against it and 17 percent of Bulgarians cannot state a view. These figures date from the beginning of May, when the dollar had not yet started its upward climb, leading to rises in fares and the prices of the food that we have to eat every day to survive. According to figures announced by the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria, over 1.5 million people have already cast their votes by coming out in the squares and in front of company officers to say what they think about the administrative skills of the "capable and all-knowing party." The crowds of protesters in dozens of towns and villages also included not a few former supporters of this party.

However, the party knows its job. It will therefore vote tomorrow under iron discipline, thus bringing the two-edged knife blade even closer to its own throat.

Bulgaria: Purvanov on Videnov's 'Mysterious Shortcomings'

AU1206141696 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 12 Jun 96 p 4

[Comment by Georgi Purvanov, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, under the rubric "Personal View": "Prime Minister Videnov Has Mysterious Shortcomings"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The accusations of rejection of dialogue and even arrogance represent a serious reproach addressed to Zhan Videnov. We are shutting ourselves off and following a policy of brilliant self-isolation, which in my view is greatly narrowing the foundation of our administration, especially in view of the unpopular measures now being carried out, as part of the government's policies in recent months. This is one of the most mysterious shortcomings of Prime Minister Videnov personally. It seems to me that on top of this he is ceasing to take serious thought. We have to admit

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that we underestimated the negative development of the processes. During our administration, there has actually been an intensification of these negative processes, but we are clearly far from achieving the desired result. It is evident that for this purpose we must try to draw the other political forces inside parliament closer to our policies.

Bulgaria: Purvanov Assesses Videnov, BSP Weaknesses

AU1306145296 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 13 Jun 96 p 10

[Interview with Georgi Purvanov, BSP deputy chairman, by Neda Popova; place and date not given: "Zhan Videnov Shuts Himself Up, and This Worries Me"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Popova] Mr. Purvanov, do you think, as some of your party members do, that the opposition no-confidence motion is a purely propaganda action aimed at winning the presidential elections?

[Purvanov] This is one of the explanations. However, the fact that the no-confidence motion debate set us back two or three years is more important for me. This is because ideological and emotional overtones dominated. The factions rendered a disservice to the Bulgarian parliament in the way they presented their arguments. We most likely contributed to decreasing the National Assembly's rating. [passage omitted]

[Popova] Do you not think that the changes in the Council of Ministers were too soft?

[Purvanov] Yes, they are unsatisfactory because they only affect a minimal part of our problems, and they are serious. Still, the new ministers are authoritative professionals and good administrators. They will improve the work of the Council of Ministers as a whole.

[Popova] As a deputy chairman of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP], how do you assess the party's present situation?

[Purvanov] When the people are talking about the BSP's serious situation, they use too many dark colors. The BSP is in a good ideological and organizational situation. However, it is not in good shape. It must be admitted that our party is confused. The Socialists have lost faith. I think that the efforts of the party leadership must be directed precisely in this sphere. However, in any event the BSP continues to be the most powerful political force in the country. [passage omitted]

[Popova] Do you not think that the troubles in the country's government are a result of BSP Chairman Videnov's incompetence?

[Purvanov] You are interpreting things rather freely. It could definitely be said that everything that happened at our last meeting suggests the idea that Videnov enjoys the necessary political confidence in the party's basic leading organ.

[Popova] What do you think about the idea of the BSP chairman on basically reshuffling the Executive Bureau.

[Purvanov] The changes are necessary to make the BSP Executive Bureau a better working and more efficient organ. Certain omissions and shortcomings in our work are emerging two years after our last congress. They must be eliminated. However, I think that replacing all members of the party's leading organ would be a mistake. The necessary continuity must be sought to make this change less painful.

[Popova] Is the conflict between Videnov and the BSP a serious one?

[Purvanov] I do not think that there is such a conflict. There really are many doubts in the party. Some party organizations are even discontent. This affects the work of the Supreme Council. However, the discontent is related to the pain and dissatisfaction, and it could by no means be described as a conflict between the party and its chairman. [passage omitted]

[Popova] Nevertheless, what are his weaknesses as prime minister?

[Purvanov] I am not very familiar with the work of the Council of Ministers, thus I cannot make a comprehensive assessment. however, what personally worries me is his and the cabinet's refusal to engage in a dialogue, as well as their inability to attract other political forces and public formations to the difficult policy of unpopular measures. I am also worried by the inability to form a broad public and social basis of the reform. This is an obvious fact, and if Videnov and we at No. 20 Positano Street [BSP headquarters] do not overcome this serious weakness, it could cost us the government.

Bulgaria: Lukanov Warns of Possible Energy Crisis

AU1306114396 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 13 Jun 96 p 13

[Article by Mariya Andonova: "Bulgaria Faces Energy Crisis in One or Two Years"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At a seminar in Varna yesterday, National Assembly Deputy Andrey Lukanov said that Bulgaria is threatened by an energy crisis in one or two years.

"The risk of an electricity shortage is especially high now that the No. 1 Reactor Unit has been shut down

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at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant," Lukanov explained. Unless we introduce further generating capacities, there will be serious disruptions in electricity supplies even in the coming winter, the deputy believes. Possibilities for saving the situation are offered by the Varna Theromoelectric Power Plant and certain factory power plants, which can operate on coal or gas. The country's strategic interests dictate that we should complete the construction of the Belene nuclear plant, which will replace the old reactor units at Kozloduy, Lukanov further declared.

Yesterday Yuriy Zaytsev, deputy chief of Russia's Gazexport, hinted that a question mark hangs over the transshipment of additional amounts of gas through Bulgaria. An agreement is being prepared on expanding the gas pipelines, he said, and a number of alternatives are under discussion. The most important factors governing the final decision are the security and flexibility of investments. In this situation, there is a risk that all the projects for increasing the transshipment of natural gas through Bulgaria may remain only on paper.

Bulgaria is a very favorable route for the transit of gas, but it is not the only one, Andrey Lukanov said yesterday, in support of Yuriy Zaytsev's statement. According to Lukanov, the government is hardly likely to be so irresponsible as to let slip this unique chance of guaranteeing our supplies over the long term. Turkey alone is planning to increase its gas consumption from 6 to 20 billion cubic meters per annum.

Lukanov believes that one cannot expect that the projects for delivery of natural gas from Iran and the Persian Gulf will be carried out within the next 10 years. Another alternative is for us to negotiate supplies of liquefied natural gas, but it is $20-30 more expensive than the Russian gas.

Bulgaria: Industry Minister Sees Future for Defense Plants

AU1206150996 Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 11 Jun 96 p 4

[Interview with Bulgarian Industry Minister Lyubomir Dachev by an unidentified BULGARSKA ARMIYA representative; place and date not given: "The Military-Industrial Complex Remains a Principal Branch of Bulgarian Industry"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [BULGARSKA ARMIYA] Minister Dachev, what place does the military-industrial complex hold in the Bulgarian economy?

[Dachev] The military-industrial complex has been and remains a principal branch of Bulgarian industry. It has produced substantial revenues in the past, and I hope it will continue to do so. It is just that basic difficulties have cropped up in our markets. These difficulties are of an objective nature, and competitors have managed to displace us by creating various barriers. Let us hope that things will improve in the future. We have production capabilities, trained personnel, modern facilities, and technologies. As you know, a considerable part of our foreign currency receipts comes from this branch of industry. This income has been reduced many times over

[BULGARSKA ARMIYA] Who is to blame for this fall in income?

[Dachev] The fault is ours. The main reason is the policies followed in the countries to which we are able to sell arms. These countries have been declared to present risks, yet other countries are selling to them. The problem is complex. I am counting our success in this field in the future.

[BULGARSKA ARMIYA] The moratorium on the privatization of defense industry companies expires in two months. The National Security Commission has already adopted its position. Do you believe some of these companies may be included on the list of firms to be privatized?

[Dachev] It is difficult for me to comment because I have not had an opportunity to acquaint myself in detail with the position at the moment. I have not yet established how many companies have already converted to civilian production. Clearly, the situation first has to be analyzed, then solutions can be proposed.

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Czech Republic: Article Views Postelection Week

AU1206180696 Prague RESPEKT in Czech 10-16 Jun 96 No 24 p 2

[Commentary by Vladimir Mlynar: "So Far, It Is 2:1 for Zeman"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The tension is easing. The first postelection week has, it seems, indeed clarified all sorts of things. Vaclav Klaus will try to form a minority government, and the parliamentary vote on its program will not be preceded by a written agreement with the opposition Social Democrats. In return, the next leader of the Chamber will be Milos Zeman himself, and his party will also fill the posts of chairmen of key parliamentary committees. And one more thing is clear: Even if the scenario outlined comes off to a T, the specter of new elections will not disappear from the Czech political scene. The only question is when they will be held or, rather, what will come after them.

Three Are Arguing, The Fourth Is Smiling

The advocates of lobby politics really came into their own last week. Namely, the Civic Democratic Party [ODS], taken by surprise by the election results, at first left all of the public activity to Milos Zeman, and he made masterly use of the opportunity. First with the help of the People's Party, but especially with the support of the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA], he promoted as a topic for discussion with the president the notion that the Social Democrats conclude a written agreement with the coalition that would determine outside of parliament under what circumstances Lidovy Dum [Social Democratic headquarters] will grant the new government support. At the same time, he raised publicly several conditions absolutely unacceptable to the ODS (for instance, the dismissal of Ministers Ruml and Vodicka and the liquidation of the barely affirmed social reform), whose nonfulfillment will enable him to declare any time in the future "I showed goodwill, but it really is impossible to reach an agreement with them." Thus, he managed to push Klaus's party into a corner and obtain a major strategic advantage.

The ODS, although the clear election winner by the number of votes gained, recovered from its jinx at the last moment. Only under the threat of walking out of the Castle talks did it manage to persuade the president to ask Klaus formally to form the new government. The future proceedings should be determined by normal democratic courses of action: The coalition should formulate a policy statement and try to secure parliament's blessing for it. But the difficulty is that ODA and the People's Party do not want to adopt this scenario so fully and are still insisting that the Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD] first define clearly the conditions under which it will allow the minority government to exist. We understand why Lux and Kalvoda are willing to give Zeman an indirect opportunity to have a say in forming the coalition after studying the ultimatums from Lidovy Dum. Of the 13 policy conditions declared by Zeman last Friday [7 June], some (for example, creating regional self-administrations, separating the pension funds from the budget, an ombudsman, and no university fees) are identical to what ODA or the People's Party—as the case may be, the two together—tried to promote in the last government. In other words, ODA and the People's Party are using Zeman as a kind of ally to push for the tenets of their own policy that came up against the resistance of the strongest party. If, of course, the ODS were to accede to an internal coalition battle in the style of "Zeman wants this, too," the Social Democrats would thus de facto enter into the government—albeit by a back and covert door. Lidovy Dum would find itself in an ideal position of power: It would make the decisions behind the scenes but would not bear the responsibility for anything in front of the public.

When The Real Crisis Comes

So, no matter what direction developments take in the next few weeks, one thing is certain: We are not going to have the stable government of the past four years. That is, even if the current coalition were to reach an agreement at last and submit a policy statement to the deputies, the fatal distribution of forces in parliament still hangs over everything. The Social Democrats control the Chamber, but only thanks to the massive presence of the Communist and Republican extremists. Zeman can duly "stifle" the government with their support and conceivably express no confidence in it at any time. If, however, he begins to govern himself, the card will be reversed. This is purely and simply a stalemate that does not even have the potential to acquire the parameters of a "proper" constitutional crisis. At the same time, to assume that "the boys up there will come to some agreement in the end" is just as nonsensical as wanting an "agreement" between fire and water.

The nightmare of those thinking in the longer-term perspective, however, is something other than the actual fact of early elections sometime next spring. The main danger is the risk that their outcome could be more or less the same as it is at the moment—that is, that neither the left nor the right will be able to form a governing majority without associating with the extremists. Something like this would be a real political crisis. A so-called grand ODS-CSSD coalition, which,

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however, would only strengthen the extremist parties on both sides of the political spectrum because of its internal scuffles and inability to function, would then have to be formed expediently. It is impossible at the moment to assess the subsequent social jolt. Is there some way out of this?

More Than Courage

At the beginning of 1990, when a discussion was held within the Civic Forum on an electoral system, the advocates of the majority principle were defeated by the argument that a proportional system preserves political plurality more and corresponds to "our tradition" better. The majority system, in which, in principle, voting takes place in smaller constituencies and always only the candidate who gets the most votes gets into parliament (as opposed to the proportional system, in which parties obtain representation according to the percentage of votes won), has, however, another advantage: Not only does it eliminate the parliamentary representation of extremist parties but also, first and foremost, it makes the political scene more transparent because of the existence of two or, as the case may be, three formations. The principle according to which the winner takes all, understandably, does not allow a situation to arise in which it is impossible to form a stable governing majority.

Given a majority electoral system under our conditions, there would be one major party on the right (the ODS), one on the left (the CSSD), and maybe even a smaller formation in the political center (the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party). The Republicans and the Communists would be left out of the game and so, of course, would ODA, which in any case awaits a coalition with the ODS in the early elections. So the effect would be obvious: The elections would determine whether Klaus or Zeman will govern; a stalemate would be out of the question.

A wave of resistance fortified by the domestic fear of "a government of one party" will certainly be raised against such considerations. Yes, the Constitution would have to be changed radically, the political palette would not be so colorful, the invoked tradition of the First Republic would be trampled on, and so on. All of this is true. There is, however, a stronger argument against this: Is it perhaps better to take the risk that the central motive of Czech policy in future years is the survival of minority governments? Is it perhaps better to be constantly afraid of the influence of political extremists, to whom the proportional system gives greater political power than corresponds to their status in society? Is it perhaps better to transfer politics from parliament to the lobbies and thus turn it into an endless bazaar in which deals are made with ideals, interests, and political functions for the sake of short-term survival?

If the idea of changing the electoral system is not promoted now, it is very likely that it will come onto the agenda at a much worse moment—after early elections, at a time of chronic constitutional crisis and the people's general disgust of politics.

Czech Republic: Parties Hold Talks on Parliamentary Posts

LD1206120596 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1000 GMT 12 June 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Representatives of the Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD] and coalition representatives [the Civic Democratic Party, the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party, KDU-CSL, and the Civic Democratic Alliance] are holding talks about filling top posts in the Chamber [of Deputies] in the Czech parliament today.

Stanislav Gross, the reelected chairman of the CSSD deputies' group, accompanied by Petra Buzkova [CSSD deputy chairwoman], met Miloslav Vyborny, the chairman of the group of deputies from the KDU-CSL, and Jan Kasal, the KDU-CSL former deputy speaker, this morning.

According to Kasal, the number of posts of deputy speakers and their allocation to political parties were discussed once again. There was reportedly almost 100-percent agreement that their number should be raised from the present four to five. The Civic Democratic Party would fill two positions, including that of the first deputy speaker, while the KDU-CSL, the Civic Democratic Alliance, and the CSSD would fill one position each. Although no names have been mentioned yet, it appears that as far as this issue is concerned there are no basic disagreements.

This applies also to increasing the number of parliamentary committees from the present 11 to 12 or 13, which is also under consideration. However, the issue that remains contentious is that of the grand recommendation, to put it mildly, made by the Social Democrats that leading posts in the committees be offered to the Communists and Republicans. As far as this issue is concerned, the coalition's position is negative after today's interim talks. [passage omitted]

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Czech Republic: ODS, Social Democrats Form Deputies' Clubs

AU1206154396 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 12 Jun 96 p 2

[Article by "(kac)": "All of the Deputies' Clubs Have Their Leaders"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The Civic Democratic Party [ODS] and the Social Democrats were yesterday the last of the six parliamentary parties to decide on the leaderships of their clubs. Jiri Honajzer remains the chairman of the legislators for the ODS, whose interests will be advocated in the Chamber by 68 deputies. Stanislav Gross was elected leader of the Social Democrats, who have seven fewer representatives. He also held this post in the last parliament.

The ODS, of course, will be choosing its [parliamentary club] chairman again shortly because Honajzer has only been confirmed in his post until the negotiations on the Chamber's leadership are completed. According to some reports, the ODS is considering him for the post of deputy chairman of the Chamber. The only two deputies' clubs whose leaderships have changed, compared with the last four years, are those of the Republicans and the Communists. Ivan Masek remains leader of the Civic Democratic Alliance deputies, while the People's Party deputies are led by Miloslav Vyborny.

Czech Republic: Zeman's Hitler Remark May Be 'Self-Destructive'

AU1206155496 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 12 Jun 96 p 12

[Commentary by Marek Stonis: "Zeman in His Old Jacket"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vaclav Klaus supporting an ombudsman, regional self-administration, and the European Social Charter and campaigning against dirty money is the same as Adolf Hitler loving the Jews. So much for the statement made by the leader of the Social Democrats for the German weekly FOCUS. Are we to understand Zeman's comment as well-considered witticism or merely his traditional impertinence? A bit of each.

Before the elections, Milos Zeman slipped on the elegant jacket of an opposition politician who is admittedly incredibly forceful but inoffensive to the voters' taste. A man who dispelled in every possible way our concerns about the undue radicalism of social democracy gazed at us from the television screens. The economic forecaster's inclinations toward low-level demagoguery, his defiant rejection of the government's evident successes, and his personal attacks on Klaus's individual ministers were gone. It has to be admitted that the wooing of the nonradical citizens was successful: The difference in the number of votes between the Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD] and the Civic Democratic Party says it all.

Of course, after the polling stations closed, the economic forecaster's new jacket immediately split at the seams, and the leader of the Social Democrats followed up on the worst traditions of his prattling. We only have to recall how he insulted the Social Democrats' possible future voters with his remark about the senile party of pensioners. Of course, it is impossible to merely wave aside his sentence comparing Klaus with Hitler. This testifies rather to the fact that its author is lingering in the dangerous grip of his personal passions—dangerous not only for him but, first and foremost, for social democracy itself: That is, its future credibility depends mainly on whether Milos Zeman can come to terms in a dignified manner with his role as leader of a state-forming opposition. This role was ascribed to him not only by the election results, but also by President Havel, when he invited the representative of Lidovy Dum [CSSD headquarters] into the club of Czech democratic parties for the talks on the postelection situation.

Zeman's tactics may be self-destructive. That is, by making this recent remark, he has ranked himself alongside the other opposition leaders, Sladek and Grebenicek. Their monopoly on comparing Klaus with Hitler has thus come to an end.

Czech Republic: Zeman Chairmanship Bid Annoys Some in CSSD

AU1206124796 Prague PRAVO in Czech 11 Jun 96 p 1

[Report by Alexandr Mitrofanov: "Part of the CSSD Thinks Zeman Is in Too Much of a Hurry To Become Chairman of the Chamber"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Some members of the Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD] leadership are unhappy that CSSD Chairman Milos Zeman made it public on Friday that he will campaign for the post of parliament chairman and consider this to be a precipitate step. A source close to the CSSD leadership gave this information to PRAVO on Monday.

According to the source, some Social Democrats view this course of action as a tacit agreement with the Civic Democratic Party on dividing up the power-wielding posts. Others are annoyed that Zeman announced his decision to campaign for the post of Chamber leader without holding thorough consultations with the Presidium or, as the case may be, with the CSSD Central Executive Committee.

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"I proceed only on the basis of the Presidium's discussions, and I personally do not think I would exchange a post for our policy ideals," said Zeman to PRAVO. According to him, he accepted the candidacy for the post of Chamber chairman for the very reason that it is possible to defend policy values better in this function than in a different one.

As of 1 July, the chairman of the Chamber of Deputies will receive a salary (concordant with that of the prime minister) of 90,500 korunas [Kc] gross plus Kc18,100 in nontaxable allowances, an official villa, an official BMW, and a bodyguard.

Zeman's unusual nervousness also testified to the tension at Monday's meeting of the CSSD Presidium. First, he brusquely ordered out of the room where the meeting was taking place a staffer from the Lidovy Dum [CSSD headquarters] apparatus, who had come in to ask if a few video clips of the meeting could be shot for television.

Later, when Zeman spotted through a half-open door the PRAVO reporter in the anteroom, he dispatched in a flash two men from his closest staff to clear the entire area around the conference room. "There is a suspicion here that you will listen at the door," said one of Zeman's men in explaining the reason for such harsh measures.

Zeman then told the PRAVO reporter that the CSSD Political Board had agreed on Monday to ban journalists from the anteroom.

According to PRAVO's information, which comes from a well-informed source, apart from the post of parliament chairman, the CSSD will also require at least one deputy chairman post and the chairmanship of at least two committees. According to the source, the Social Democrats will endorse Petra Buzkova for the post of deputy chairwoman of the Chamber. Josef Wagner or Michal Kraus is to be nominated for the post of chairman of the Budget Committee, and CSSD First Deputy Chairman Karel Machovec is to be nominated for the post of chairman of the Agriculture Committee. The CSSD is apparently vacillating in its attempt to fill the post of chairman of the Defense and Security Committee.

A possible candidate for this post, according to PRAVO's information, could be Stanislav Gross, the current leader of the CSSD Deputies' Club.

Czech Republic: Harsher Faction Formed Within CSSD

AU1306080596 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 12 Jun 96 p 2

[Report by "km, jik": "A Group of Social Democrats Want To Move Against the Government Much Harder Than Zeman"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—A faction has formed in the opposition Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD] a few days after the elections, which has views that differ from those advocated by the party chairman, Milos Zeman.

Deputy Zdenek Jicinsky advocates a different trend of opinion, it is thought. As opposed to Zeman, he opts for a much harder stand regarding the coalition and even refuses the chair of the Chamber of Deputies for Zeman. It seems, however, that his supporters are in the minority because the Deputies' Club of the Social Democrats officially confirmed Zeman's candidacy for the post yesterday.

Jicinsky, who was deputy even in the former Federal Assembly, wants to implement an entirely different form of support for the minority government of the hitherto coalition. "We are not going to reject the minority government of the coalition, but this does not mean that we would support it. We will only tolerate its existence," Jicinsky stated yesterday.

One member of the CSSD Central Executive Committee confirmed that several members of social democracy proposed that three Czech Social Democratic Party deputies leave the meeting hall during the government confidence vote. Thereby, the coalition, which has only 99 deputies in the 200-member chamber, would have a majority among the present deputies. "The CSSD deputies, who stayed in the chamber during the vote, could abstain, and the government would be approved just thanks to the coalition deputies," the member of the Central Committee said.

The group around Jicinsky disagrees with the candidacy of the head of the Social Democrats, Milos Zeman, for the post of chair of the parliament, particularly because it allegedly will weaken his party function. "Zeman will no longer be a representative of the party but rather of the parliament. I would prefer to see him in the post of chairman of the Deputies' Club," Jicinsky said. Zeman could far more aggressively criticize government politics from that post. Deputy Pavel Dostal is considered a supporter of some of Jicinsky's views. Nevertheless, he refused to comment yesterday on the information on different views regarding Zeman's candidacy.

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Zeman said that suspecting him of moderating his criticism of the coalition is nonsense. "This can only come from someone who has not followed my work over the past years," he stated.

Czech Republic: Secret Service Gets New Headquarters

96CH0099A Prague RESPEKT in Czech 1-8 Apr 96 p 5

[Article by Jaroslav Spurny: "The Legacy of the StB (State Security)"]

[FBIS Translated Text] By the end of this year, the Security Information Service [BIS] will be moving to a new facility. The media have carried the report that the facility is overly expensive. The chief of the service, Stanislav Devaty, characterized the listed price of 1.5 billion korunas [Kc] as being "considerably exaggerated," but, in comparison with the rest of the world, even this cost would be monstrously cheap: For example, the headquarters of the Israeli Mosad, recomputed in terms of korunas, amounted to approximately Kc25 billion. The problem is, thus, not the money alone, but rather what the office headed by Devaty will get for its money. In this respect, the facility does not offer its new owners many reasons to rejoice.

Its very location is already causing embarrassment in specialized circles: The future BIS headquarters is picturesquely planted on the outskirts of the Stodulky settlement, between the bulwark of multistory high-rise apartment buildings and the Prague-Plzen expressway. A casual observer can virtually see all the way to the kitchen of the counterintelligence people from any location in the neighborhood. Moreover, not only will the employees of the office find their new headquarters too small, but, according to specialists, things are also bad with respect to providing security: The property is said to be inadequately secure against a terrorist attack, against monitoring or disrupting its computer network.

The facility at Stodulky began to be built in 1981 for use by the Fourth Directorate of State Security—the so-called surveillance service. As a matter of interest, this StB [State Security] directorate (one of 13) had approximately 900 employees at the end of the 1980's—more than the entire BIS has today. But the team headed by S. Devaty needs more room for equipment. The post-November secret service was assigned to a facility that was under construction and was a complex within the framework of the division of property given up by the Ministry of the Interior five years ago.

In 1991-95, the Ministry of Finance is estimated to have invested approximately Kc900 million in the home of BIS—the precise amount is being kept secret by Minister Kocarnik as well as by BIS. According to the BIS budget, an additional Kc181 million are expected to be invested to complete the headquarters. Naturally, this is not the only investment made by the secret service for purposes of renovating or acquiring real estate. Branch offices in smaller towns and specialized work sites will swallow up about Kc400 million between 1995 and 1998. Telephones, telephone exchanges, and radio communications will require an investment of Kc90 million, and computer networks will call for approximately Kc50 million in additional investments.

Saving money on the headquarters at Stodulky would obviously not be too worthwhile. Secret service facilities must be closed off in a constantly more complicated manner and protected against constantly more perfected intelligence collection equipment operated by inquisitive competitors. No windows can get by anymore without the application of a special foil to frustrate the monitoring of conversations by measuring the oscillations of vibrating glass. Computers radiate electromagnetic rays that can be monitored over a distance of several kilometers, and a possible spy can ascertain the principles of the operating system in use or even read specific top secret data. That is why offices are being built like so-called Faraday cages, which do not permit radiation to get through. The protective system of cameras and sensors spread around the facility will also cost millions. Security costs something, and that is why specialists are surprised that, in the case of the Stodulky facility, some risks that are virtually offering themselves are being frivolously overlooked.

Recently, all workers who were involved in building the facility were vetted. This allegedly occurred after BIS received a signal indicating that the Dynastav Construction Company was sending Ukrainian workers to Stodulky. Without the experts wanting to suspect anyone, they had visions of the recollections involving the U.S Embasssy in Moscow. (In the mid-1980's, it was built on orders from Washington by the Russians, and the building was so laced through with listening devices that the Americans in the end preferred to tear it down.) The Ukrainians building the Czech counterintelligence headquarters finally turned out to be Slovaks: Someone simply mistook the east Slovakia dialect for Ukrainian.

Despite the fact that it is not known who worked on the construction project before 1989, the installation of "enemy" microphones in the offices of the StB is not likely. At the same time, however, it cannot be said with certainty—the project is virtually not secured in any way—that, in the last five years, someone has not "patched in" to the developing computer network. If this has occurred, then the specialists do not feel that it will

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be possible to ascertain this fact even through a carefully executed security check.

The interior of the facility can be seen from all sides, and there is no problem in monitoring, for example, the motor pool of the secret service—say, from a rented apartment in the high-rise apartment building. BIS had a gasoline pump installed in the courtyard, even though a normal public filling station is located 100 meters away. For possible terrorists, it will not be a complicated matter to attach a small packet of Semtex to the supply tank and to blow up the entire facility while someone is fueling.

Five years ago, the secret service, which was made independent at the time, gave no consideration at all to a number of risks—the leadership was glad that the new department had found some place to which it could move. Although the current leadership of BIS admits the existence of risks, the probable "activation" of these risks is said to be small. Whether this will be applicable in five or 10 years remains a question.

Czech Republic: British Investors Seek More Investment

96CH0084C Prague PRAGUE POST in English 2 Apr 96 p 16

[Article by Katerina Rus: "British Search for a Bigger Piece of the Czech Investment Pie"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Even though recent Czech National Bank statistics claim the biggest portfolio investors in the country are from the United Kingdom, most British investors here would prefer to invest more.

"Several (British) subjects are interested in investing in the Czech Republic, but they can't invest as much as they would like because there's nothing for sale," said National Property Fund chairman Roman Ceska in a LIDOVE NOVINY interview.

Mike Connor, the first secretary of the British Embassy's commercial section, agreed there is room for greater activity. "A number of British companies are interested in becoming strategic partners in the Czech Republic," he said.

One area in which the British have shown significant interest is Czech energy distribution firms. John Hinze, local manager for British Gas, has been in the Czech Republic for two and a half years, hoping to gain shares in Czech gas companies. Thus far, he has not been successful, primarily because the government hasn't any shares to sell to foreign investors.

But there are other problems that need to be solved before British Gas will enter the market. According to Hinze, two major issues need to be resolved.

"One turnoff is that there are no clear regulatory systems for the utility companies (in the Czech Republic)," he said. Hinze believes that Czech companies need more independence from government interference, but that there appears to be no guarantee that will take place anytime soon.

The other dilemma concerns price-setting. Household prices, which are very low due to government subsidies, do not reflect real costs. Consequently, potential investors have a difficult time calculating profit margins.

"The government has got to increase prices to levels that reflect the actual costs," said Hinze. "Industry customers are subsidizing the household customers. Basically, (the Czech Republic) needs to get away from this cross-subsidiary system."

British investors here are primarily interested in two types of investments: portfolio investments subject to market fluctuations, and direct long-term investments, such as British retailer Tesco's recent purchase of Kmart's Czech and Slovak stores.

British Gas is showing more interest in the latter. Hinze said he would prefer having about 20 percent of the company's shares in two of the eight existing gas companies. Contrary to typical take-over actions, he said British Gas is not interested in making management changes to these firms, but rather in assisting them in improving performance.

"We want to work in partnership with (Czech) management (because) they know the local situation best," Hinze said. British Gas has valuable experience to offer such partnerships since the company was state-owned before being privatized by former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, he added.

A similar scenario exists between potential British investors and Czech electricity distribution companies. Midlands Electricity representatives, for example, have been visiting the Czech Republic since 1991 in search of investment opportunities.

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"We would like to make a minority investment so that we could share our experience in commercialization and improved customer service, since we were privatized in 1990," said Roger Gill, business development director for Midlands. But he added that there are issues that need to be resolved before the Czech electricity industry can be privatized, and Midlands would show serious interest—such as the trading relationship between distributors and CEZ, the state-run utilities conglomerate.

Ceska stressed that shortly after the upcoming elections, the government is expected to finalize the privatization of all companies in which it holds shares. So perhaps British investors will soon have an even greater presence here.

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Slovakia: Goncz Accused of Trying To 'Rewrite' History

AU1206135996 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 11 Jun 96 pp 1-2

[Commentary by Dusan Slobodnik, chairman of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee: "Error? No, Intention!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] When an intelligent person errs once, it can be ascribed to a momentary indisposition. But when an intelligent person commits the same mistake a second time, moreover after being alerted to it, it is his intention, and must be ascribed to an attempt to defy the facts. A few months ago Hungarian President Arpad Goncz delivered a speech in Great Britain in which he spoke, among other issues, about the history of the Magyars. In that speech he did not mention even one word about the fact that the country to which the Magyars' nomadic ancestors had come was inhabited by Slavs, who had their own well-developed empire there called Great Moravia (let me leave aside for the moment the recent discussions in Slovak historiography about the empire's name).

Explaining in that speech the Magyars' history, President Arpad Goncz mentioned all kinds of roots and communities—the Quadi, the Huns, the Avars, the Tatars, the Turks. But he did not say even one word about the Slavs in general or about our Slovak ancestors in particular.

Well, at that time it could have been a momentary indisposition on the part of President Arpad Goncz, an instance of forgetfulness.

A few days ago Arpad Goncz received in Paris an honorary doctorate from Sorbonne University. Sincere congratulations. But I cannot understand how an intellectual, how a writer could once again repeat his emasculated view of the Magyars' history. Again he spoke about everyone from the Quadi to the Turks, but not even one word was said about Slavs. It is obvious that this is intentional—a desire not to show what kind of territory it was that the Magyars' ancestors had invaded, and a desire to rewrite history and to uphold the autochthonous nature (Hun-Magyar continuity?) of Magyar settlement in the "Carpathian basin."

Incidentally, the very term Carpathian basin that Arpad Goncz used in his speech at the Sorbonne is misleading, to put it euphemistically. The president considers the Carpathian basin to be the Magyars' autochthonous territory, their homeland. Yet on the sides of the Carpathian mountains, in the entire Western Carpathian region, there exists no Hungarian settlement to this day. One cannot but recommend to President Goncz, and to all the defenders of the autochthonous nature of the Magyar ancestors' settlement around the Danube and the Balaton, a small language course. It will hopefully convince them (although I doubt it, given the stubbornness with which they deny the existence of the Slavs and the Slovaks' ancestors in this territory) that they had come to a developed and culturally advanced country. Many Hungarian words from the settled way of life and much of the Christian and legal terminology is of Slavic origin. These terms were found among the Slavic population that lived here before their arrival. Just think about [Hungarian] words such as szalma, szena, udvar, asztal, ablak, glamb, ebed, vacsora, kulcs, kereszt (and many others)—that is, slama [Slovak for straw], seno [hay], dvor [yard], stol [table], oblok [window], holub [pigeon], obed [lunch], vecera [dinner], kluc [key], kriz [cross]. Or will a Hungarian philologist be found who will claim that the Slovaks have adopted these words from Hungarian? Everything is possible, a certain Hungarian scientist (I. Bodo) already "transferred" the territory of the Great Moravian Empire to former Yugoslavia....

It is my wish that President Arpad Goncz may receive many more honorary doctorates. I firmly hope that in his speeches to mark those occasions, he will also mention the Slavs, as well as the difference between pre-1918 Hungary and present Hungary. For the time being we have to remind the management of Sorbonne University of this ourselves.

Post scriptum: Perhaps even the Slovak president will dare to remind President Arpad Goncz of the above during their imminent meeting. But he prefers to hear another president—Vaclav Havel—lecturing and defaming Slovakia in his presence. Well, let us wait and see.

Slovakia: Current Czech-Slovak Relations Viewed

96CH0095A Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 3 Apr 96 pp 1, 4

[Article by Petr Uhl, editor in chief of LISTY, a bimonthly published in Prague: "A View From Beyond Moravia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For Czech politicians and journalists, and thus for the less-well-informed citizens, it is more and more difficult to clarify what the political and generally social situation in Slovakia is and then to reproduce these findings in Czech society. The first problem has to do with the objectivity of the information sources. The democratic opposition is always the most competent source of critical information and for the creation of a truthful image of a country. The representatives of the Slovak Democratic Party and, primar-

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ily, Slovak democratic journalists, however, have been accustomed since the initial disputes with Vladimir Meciar in 1990 to considerably exaggerate everything that is negative.

I find it difficult, particularly today, when things in Slovakia are getting tough, to write about the demonizing of Meciar and about the exaggeration of criticism applicable to Slovak conditions. Although it is unbelievable, the National Council of the Slovak Republic actually adopted a law—it amended the Federal Criminal Code—that expands the existing chapter on criminal acts aimed against the Republic. If the Constitutional Court does not rescind this law, then the adopted law can restrict human rights by a method that is completely incompatible with the democratic arrangement of society and with the List of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, which is a part of the Slovak Constitution. The adopted law is, thus, a serious violation of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the International Treaty on Civil and Political Rights and the European Agreement on Protecting Human Rights—in other words, it violates Slovak obligations with respect to those countries that are members of this treaty and are members of the Council of Europe. Incidentally, what is the value of the treaty with Hungary, which is a member of both of these groups of states, when its ratification was preceded by adoption of a law that also violated Slovak obligations with respect to Hungary? But let us be honest: Perhaps there was no talk in Slovakia—without a knowledge of the former and pre-November legal arrangement and without any knowledge of the new proposals—regarding a law to protect the Republic long before the government attempted last summer to include it in a proposal that it subsequently failed to adopt? The newspapers carried some unqualified articles about it at least a year prior to last summer. The spreading of the most varied rumors did not help matters; in recent weeks, when it was necessary to concentrate forces and to also rely on foreign institutions (the Council of Europe, the EU [European Union], the U.S. State Department, the international extragovernmental organizations, and so forth), the necessary pressure was not successfully brought to bear on the Meciar government. Apart from the fact that the democratic opposition did not act with sufficient vigor (disregarding a little belated pounding on the parliamentary benches), this can also be attributed to the fact that a shouting from those sitting down was not heard because they frequently shouted about the wrong things.

And even though it may be difficult, it is not impossible to at least determine the approximate state of things in Slovakia from Prague or from Brno. There is no language barrier, the majority of the laws and legal standards continue to be the same or differ only insignificantly, and the Slovak information media are characterized by a considerable degree of pluralism, so that it is possible to compare and choose. And to the extent to which the image of Slovakia, presented by the Czech press and radio and television and frequently also by politicians, tends to be distorted, then this is not only due to Slovak sources. The majority of Czech journalists and politicians have still not rid themselves of the false images of Slovakia, as well as of the Czech Republic and of Europe—they are swayed by ideology. It is as if nothing has changed since 1990-92: In the Czech Republic, the "nationbuilders" gratefully accept and reproduce even substantively incorrect or unjust criticism of Slovak conditions only so as to prove that the Czech Government is doing things (relatively) well and that the separation of Slovakia was correct and that the Czechs in general are the best and the East, including Slovakia, is suspect. In any event, Europe ends at the eastern borders of Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary and these three partners of the Czechs in the Visegrad grouping can be grateful that the Czechs are dispatching deputy ministers to attend the meeting of their ministers who warn against the unnecessary "institutionalization"—in other words, against the intensification of collaboration. This is the new Czech state resonance, patched together from state isolationism, state (not ethnic) nationalism, anti-German reminiscences, and aversion toward Russia, which borders on an irrational anti-Russian phobia.

Nevertheless, some arguments dating back to the times of the separation of Slovakia from Czechoslovakia have evaporated—for example, the idea that the Czech lands are correctly stepping to the right, while Slovakia has elected the leftist path. There is not too much talk in the Czech Republic regarding Slovakia's "leftness." Consider the following: the privatization scandals in the Czech Republic; the criticism of "banking socialism" (the majority of the large enterprises are at least in part owned by the banks that also own each other mutually and that are again to a considerable extent owned by the Czech state); finding that the gross domestic product in Slovakia is higher and the measure of inflation in Slovakia is lower than that in the Czech Republic; the virtually extreme rightist manifestations of the SNS [Slovak National Party] with respect to the nationality minorities; and the modest rehabilitation of the word from the left. But it remains a sad fact that the overwhelming majority of Czechs have not only become reconciled to the state defeat of a common federation, but actually consider it to be more advantageous to Czech society. State resonance in a democratic society is a matter for a society-wide consensus and the Czechs have, by and large, accepted this new postfederal

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resonance, complete with its anti-Slovak (and anti-European) sharp points.

In this connection, it is interesting to monitor the attitudes of the Czech Social Democrats, who have established a sort of double tradition in terms of modern Slovak-Czech relationships. First of all, this is a tradition of collaboration in the European spirit, which is not an abstract concept, but a valorization of the specific relationships between European and primarily adjacent countries. In 1992, Milos Zeman stood at its beginning when, upon his proposal, the Federal Assembly agreed with the creation of a commission that was to deal with the establishment of a Czecho-Slovak union as a suprastate unit that would subsequently make use of the natural method to become integrated in the EU. Another tradition, the tradition of the current state resonance, can be espoused by those Social Democrats who were satisfied by Valtr Komarek and other delegates of this party, without whose votes the law on the demise of the federation would not have ben adopted.

The Czech nationbuilding idea, as expressed in the new state resonance, also impacted the CSSD [Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party]. For this party, which is serious about European integration, the relationship with Slovakia is important. I was reminded of this during a recent television debate on the Czech judicial system and on the legal protection of human rights. The deputy chairman of the CSSD, Petra Buzkova, said right in the introduction in this regard that, although an isolated scribbler could be found in the Czech Republic, the Czechs are much better off in this regard in comparison with the Slovaks. There, she was saying 14 days before the law was adopted in the National Council of the Slovak Republic, they had adopted such a law to protect the Republic that it is clear that Slovakia is embarking on another road. Her formulations betrayed the fact that Buzkova does not know of what she speaks and, as it turned out, she was basing her across-the-board condemnation of Slovakia on an erroneous news agency report. It was as though Buzkova had overlooked the fact that eight criminal acts against the republic decorate the Czech criminal law, and that it was precisely for two court cases for more than a controversial "vilification of the Republic and its representative" that the U.S. State Department recently criticized the Czech Republic and not Slovakia. Although this provision also exists in Slovakia, no one has been convicted there of violating it. Even for Petra Buzkova it could be true that anyone who opposes evil in their own country has the moral right to point out such evils at a distance, which is generally more comfortable.

In the final analysis, I do not believe that, on television, Buzkova would only casually spit into the face of the neighboring country out of envy. She almost figures on the fact that her voters are followers of the new justification of state existence and would welcome such an expectoration. I have a better opinion of social democratic voters. That is why I am vexed by the fact that the party as a whole is toying with Czech isolationism. The touchstone of CSSD attitudes toward Slovakia at the upcoming session of the Czech Chamber of Delegates will be the Slovak-Czech state treaty, which has already been adopted by the Slovak parliament. For Czech nationbuilding delegates, it contains a controversial point involving the annexation of the U Sabotu Community by Slovakia. Some social democratic delegates have meanwhile come out in defense of the Czech minority (which the Czech state will richly indemnify) on the basis of their nationalistic positions.

In view of the above-mentioned dual tradition, the Czech Social Democrats carry a great political responsibility for Slovak-Czech relationships. It is also up to them as to whether people in the Czech lands will learn the truth about Slovakia and whether this truth will lead to closer relationships between both countries and to European integration in general.

Slovakia: Prime Minister's Voice Needs Rest, Spokesman Says

AU1206134296 Bratislava SME in Slovak 12 Jun 96 p 2

[Report by "sp, jam": "The Government Debated Without the Prime Minister; Meciar Needs, Above All, To Rest His Vocal Cords"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bratislava—The government met yesterday without Vladimir Meciar, who still is on sick leave. According to spokesman Magda Pospisilova, Meciar's state of health is gradually improving but it is necessary to wait for the finding of the board of physicians that will meet at the end of the week. "The prime minister needs, above all, to rest his vocal cords," Pospisilova added. [passage omitted]

Slovakia: HZDS MP: Kovac Aide Admits to Anti-Meciar 'Conspiracy'

AU1306073896

[FBIS Report] Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak on 12 June on pages 1 and 5 carries a 1,200-word commentary by Dusan Slobodnik, MP for the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] Foreign Affairs Committee, entitled "Slovakia on the Threshold of Civil War?" The commentary, which responds to an article on Slovakia that appeared in the 1-2 June issue of the Paris daily FIGARO, views

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statements made in the article by an (unidentified) adviser of President Kovac as an admission that the Presidential Office is "preparing a conspiracy against the legitimately elected government."

In the first part of the commentary, Slobodnik accuses various Slovak opposition figures (Christian Democratic Movement Deputy Chairman Frantisek Miklosko; member of the Democratic Party leadership Frantisek Sebej; writer Martin Simecka; secretary of the Slovak Bishops' Conference Peter Fidermak) of having "misinformed" J.J. Mevel, the author of the FIGARO article, about the situation in the country "with the aim of consciously damaging Slovakia and disrupting its development." Slobodnik takes issue, in particular, with their claims that the death of Robert Remias, a witness in the Kovac Jr. kidnapping case, was "the first case of a political assassination," that Slovakia is heading toward a "cold civil war," that Meciar and his party are building a "paternalistic, authoritarian, and, in certain aspects, fascistic state," that Slovakia is returning to the "communist era," and that Meciar's party wants to "have everything under its control."

The concluding part of Slobodnik's commentary is devoted to comments made in the FIGARO article by an unidentified adviser of President Kovac. The relevant passage reads: "The last section of the FIGARO article is an indictment of the president and his staff and every citizen of the Slovak Republic who cares about the future of his children and grandchildren should read it every day to learn the truth about the Castle's [seat of president] being above party affairs, the truth about where Castle power wants to lead Slovakia. "'The opposition has a hard life but, to Michal Kovac's great despair, it has not been able to overcome differences between the extreme left, the heir to the only party, the right center, and the significant representation of the Hungarian minority. It is almost enough to drive one to despair," observes one of the president's advisers. "On the one hand, there is a strong opposition in the cities but it is unable to establish a credible political force. On the other hand there is the prime minister, popular in the countryside, who knows only strength and, above all, very cunning relations.'"

"This is how the president and his 'objective' advisers see the situation in Slovakia. Such are the plans being plotted in the president's office. This is how they intend to put also the 'significant representation of the Hungarian minority' to the anti-Slovak cart.

"Here it is appropriate to ask Cicero's question from the Senate of Rome: 'Quo usque tandem abutere, Catalina, patientia nostra?,'—'How much longer will you abuse our patience, Catalina?' I am asking the president to reply to this question, to explain how much truth there is in the claims of the French journalist. Who is preparing a conspiracy against the legitimately elected government? Who wants to repeat not only March 1994 [when parliament passed a no-confidence vote in Meciar] but also last fall, which was saturated with events aimed at bringing the government and Slovakia to their knees? How much longer will this game against the will of the voters continue?"

Slovakia: Slota: Kozlik Exceeded Powers in Insurance Affair

AU1306094396 Bratislava SME in Slovak 12 Jun 96 pp 1-2

[Report by "sp": "Slovak National Party Chairman Jan Slota Does Not Like Sergej Kozlik's Involvement in the Slovenska Poistovna Affair"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—"There are several matters that need to be finally settled. Everyone could hear that the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] chairman did not include certain laws on the legislature's agenda. This could be a certain signal. If there is to be peace in this country and a wave of discontent is not to rise, the coalition should continue at all costs. We must solve the problems, on which our views differ," Slovak National Party [SNS] Chairman Jan Slota said yesterday about the results of coalition talks that were to solve current tensions within the government coalition. Let us recall in this context that NRSR Chairman Ivan Gasparovic did not include on the legislature's agenda for renewed discussion, already for the second time, the Law on Territorial and Administrative Arrangement and the Penal Code amendment, which were returned by the president. After yesterday's second round of coalition talks there is consensus, according to Jan Slota, on the need to expeditiously wind up privatization. "We all are convinced that protracting privatization creates certain tension, even among political entities and, of course, in society at large. This is not the best atmosphere in which to restructure economic life in our country. There is stealing going on in state companies waiting to be privatized," he observed. The conflicts in the coalition came to a head after the dismissal of several members of the management of Slovenska Poistovna [Slovak Insurance Company; SP] who are close to the SNS.

Asked whether the SNS had agreed with Prime Minister Meciar on the original composition of SP bodies, Jan Slota replied: "The Poistovna issue is rather problematic. All of this should be reassessed at the meeting of experts on Wednesday [12 June]." Asked whether the SNS would demand a change in the post of Deputy

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Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Sergej Kozlik, Jan Slota said: "It is premature to talk about this but the deputy prime minister's great involvement in this entire matter is something I do not like." On CT1 [Czech Television One] news Jan Slota confirmed that at the coalition talks there was also a discussion about a recording of Sergej Kozlik's conversation that proves his personal involvement in the SP case. According to Jan Slota, who said that he heard the recording, it clearly transpires from its contents that Kozlik exceeded his powers. As for the opinion of the SNS and the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS] that the privatization of banks should be postponed, the HZDS "is of a slightly different opinion," according to Jan Slota. Regarding the SNS's next demand, that the Special Supervisory Body [OKO] for monitoring the activity of the Slovak Information Service [SIS] and National Property Fund [FNM] bodies be expanded to include representatives of the opposition, Jan Slota commented: "Our coalition partner is inclined toward the idea of people from the opposition being in OKO but, as far as the FNM is concerned, the situation is a bit different."

According to findings of the daily SME, SIS Director Ivan Lexa went to Trencianske Teplice Monday [10 June] evening, where he met the prime minister, and yesterday he returned to Bratislava. Asked whether Lexa attended also the coalition talks, the SNS chairman remarked: "No, he did not." Commenting on Olga Keltosova's statement that the HZDS should win the next elections so that it can do without coalition partners, Jan Slota said that "the lady minister was exaggerating, at the very least," and added: "I respect the lady minister but every person has some lapses [sklzy] in life when he or she does not think something through to the end."

Slovakia: New SP Director General Assumes Office

AU1206150096 Bratislava SME in Slovak 12 Jun 96 p 1

[TASR report: "Edita Bukovska Assumed the Post of Director of Slovenska Poistovna Yesterday Evening"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Edita Bukovska assumed the post of director general of Slovenska Poistovna Co. [SP, Slovak Insurance Co.] yesterday evening. This was decided by the supervisory board (DR) in its session yesterday, which had been summoned by board member Milan Rehak, representing the SP majority holder, the National Property Fund of the Slovak Republic. This course of action was facilitated by the decision on Monday to make changes in the statutes of the SP enabling any DR member to call a session under certain circumstances. The DR also confirmed yesterday the validity of its decision of 31 May that resulted in changes in the SP executive.

Slovakia: Change of Electoral System Considered

96CH0115A Kosice DOMINO EFEKT in Slovak 9 May 96 p 2

[Article by Ondrej Dostal: "The Hour of Truth for Majority Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] V. Meciar has obviously tired of being prime minister; otherwise, he would not be attempting to change the current election system to a majority system or a combination system, as he has already announced. After all, in the existing system, he is generally well-off, and, if we are to believe the latest public opinion polls, he could remain as prime minister safely, without changing the electoral system. But if he wants to become chancellor or a strong president within the presidential system, then he must change the Constitution, an act that requires at least 90 votes. It is precisely for the purpose of achieving this number of votes that the majority electoral system is supposed to serve him. On the other hand, this system could bring even him a surprise, as a consequence of which he would have to change his prime minister's portfolio for an opposition seat. But obviously this risk is worthwhile for him.

The released information about the intent to change the electoral system was not an incidental pronouncement. V. Meciar needs to test the waters. To replace a proportional system with a majority system is not all that simple. The opposition realizes that it could lose a lot. At the very least, it could lose the opportunity to defend against special-purpose changes in the Constitution—if not more. Therefore, Meciar cannot count on the votes of the opposition. And although the politicians of the KDH [Christian Democratic Movement] and DU [Democratic Union] give the appearance that a majority electoral system would not bother them in theory, in actual fact not even their delegate will be in favor of the proposed new electoral law. It is, thus, difficult to expect the divided government coalition to give rise to such a specific proposal for which they could raise their hand in voting approval.

But even the smaller coalition partners, the SNS [Slovak National Party] and ZRS [Agrarian and Worker Party], will cause problems, because by voting for the majority election law they would be signing their own death warrant. However, 18 months of experience with the current government coalition indicate that its relationship with the ZRS and the SNS is, when all is said and done, only a matter of the correct stipulated price. In such matters Meciar knows his way around relatively well, so that

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nothing will be lost. And, most importantly, everything will be decided within the government coalition and without regard to the position taken by the opposition.

Under present conditions in Slovakia there would be no fundamental difference between a majority system and a mixed election system. Even within a mixed system, the overall results would be decided primarily by contests in single-mandate districts—in other words, in that part of parliament elected by the majority system.

The final image of the law could be highly variable. It depends on the type of majority system (single round, two-round), it depends on the method used in combining it with a relative system (which portion of the delegates will be elected by which system), and it depends on other restrictions (a prohibition of forming preelection coalitions, increasing the size of the quorum required for coalitions or individual parties to enter parliament). However, these are all only nuances that do not address the essence of the problem.

The fundamental outlines of the new situation remain the same, without regard to the specific language of the election law and even without regard to the identification of election districts and krajs. The SNS and ZRS will degenerate to the level of dwarfs of the type represented by the Agrarian Party of Slovakia or the Party of the Slovak Green Alternative of Z. Lazar. Magnified by such dwarfs, the new and large HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] will be so strong that it will only be possible for the entire opposition to resist it. Together. To the man. No independent leftist policies by the SDL [Party of the Democratic Left]. No pulling away from the Hungarian parties. No introspection and cultivation of a feeling of exclusivity on the part of the KDH. No naive notions regarding the quality of its own candidates, which, on the basis of their personal qualities, can prove able to defeat the nonexpressive candidates of the HZDS. An opposition party that, in a majority system, decides to abandon the opposition corral and go it alone will not only eliminate itself, but will most likely drag the remainder of the opposition with it into the abyss. With 10-12 percent (this is today the strongest showing of the opposition parties), it is impossible to oppose the HZDS, which, augmented by the voters of the SNS and ZRS, will possibly achieve four times that percentage. However, it is possible to use these numbers to fatefully weaken the entire democratic opposition.

The leaders of the opposition parties will thus need to be repeatedly reminded that, in a majority system, their only chance is personified by a common approach. This will, understandably, also have to do with that portion of parliament that will be elected by the majority method. In that portion that will be elected by the proportional method, a unison of all opposition parties would not be purposeful, but would even be counterproductive. It is possible to address a broader spectrum of voters through a separate approach and by stressing their own personalities. And even here it would be rational to create smaller but nevertheless politically more homogeneous opposition blocs—a rightist bloc, a leftist bloc, and a Hungarian bloc. For voters, this would simplify decisionmaking (they would be left only with three opposition alternatives) and it would simplify cooperation for the opposition (three opposition blocs would find it easier to agree than would nine opposition parties).

The smallest problems in this regard exist in the Hungarian portion of the opposition spectrum. The Hungarian triple coalition (MKDH [Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement], MOS [Hungarian Civic Party], and the Coexistence Party) proved itself as far back as the last elections, and even in spite of occasional conflicts, all three parties are counting on the coalition into the future. For the democratic camp, this means around 10 percent more or less certain votes.

However, since the elections, a leftist coalition under the slogan of Common Choice (Spolocna volba) has been functioning. However, its future is not quite as certain as is the case of the Hungarian coalition. The SDL and Social Democrats (SDSS) do not exclude a future merger into a single party; at present, however, they have their own problems. How the Greens will act and how the Movement of Farmers will act is hard to say. The positions of the left remain open in the direction of numerous voters of the coalition parties (HZDS, ZRS) and with respect to the KSS [Communist Party of Slovakia]. But watch out—the opening is in both directions.

As far as mutual rapprochement is concerned, the parties to the right of center are evidently worse off. The KDH is afraid that the others will reap the benefits that it has prepared through its tough opposition work, and the KDH therefore has a tendency to go it alone. The DU is more oriented toward all-opposition activities, where it can assert an entitlement to the important position of a link between the left and the right. The DS [Democratic Party] is handicapped as a result of a single-mandate parliamentary representation and once more by having garnered fewer than 5 percent of the votes. The KDH and DU would likely be happier if there were no DS and if they could share its voters among themselves. The KDH and DU, however, are ideologically distant from each other and an alliance between the Christian conservatives from the KDH and the liberals from the DU, excluding the liberal-conservative DS, would likely be a special phenomenon from the political-science

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standpoint. The voters of the DU and DS have problems accepting the KDH. The leadership of the DU and DS, in turn, has some problems with mutual acceptance. In spite of this, however, the greatest opposition potential is concealed precisely to the right of center today. An addition of the voter preferences of the KDH, DU, and DS represents a decent 20-25 percent, which are numbers that already begin to damage the hitherto unthreatened sovereignty of the HZDS.

V. Meciar made a mistake when, two and a half years prior to the election, he reminded the opposition of the possibility that the election system might be changed. He could have been preparing for this change quietly and could have accomplished it unexpectedly a few months prior to the elections. In such a case, the opposition would not have had the slightest chance. Now, however, thanks to Meciar's mistake, it has a chance. And it is also up to it how it will make use of its opportunity. It is generally quite well possible that in the fall there will be no change in the electoral system. Meanwhile, the SNS and ZRS can think it over—a few certain positions on the HZDS candidate list might be more comfortable for them than a battle to overcome the 5-percent limit.

But the opposition already knows that this could happen, that the electoral system could be changed, even at the last moment. That is why it must prepare for such a possibility in order to know how to react with flexibility. If it is unable to do so, it will thus assist V. Meciar in rectifying the mistake he made by beginning to talk about a change in the electoral system. It would not be the first time. However, for this opposition team, it could well be the last time.

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Hungary: Slovak President Addresses Assembly

LD1206182496 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1130 GMT 12 Jun 96

[Speech by Slovak President Michal Kovac to the Hungarian National Assembly in Budapest; Kovac speaks in Slovak with superimposed interpreter's translation into Hungarian—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Esteemed Mr. President of the Republic, esteemed Mr. Speaker, esteemed deputies, esteemed guests: It is a great honor and pleasure, as the first democratically elected president of the independent Slovak Republic, to be able to appear before the legislative body of the Hungarian Republic. Our nations, our peoples, are linked by a more-than-1,000-year bond.

There have been moments in our common history when we progressed in mutual trust, side by side; however, there have also been times which were full of misunderstanding on both sides, when we stood back to back, indeed when we took up arms against one another. In truth, both are parts of our common history, and the question of what we will draw out of our common history, what we will set store by in a positive manner as regards our future, and what we definitely plan to avoid will depend primarily on us.

In connection with this, I would especially like to point out that the official visit to the Hungarian Republic by the president of the Slovak Republic is taking place shortly after the basic treaty on cooperation and good-neighborly relations between our countries has come into force. I am emphasizing this because on the basis of the generally recognized principles of democracy in our countries undergoing transformation, it is up to our parliaments to monitor the implementation of the foreign policy chosen by our countries.

Alongside the two countries' governments, it is up to the two parliaments— and I am of the sincere conviction that they will do so—to oversee the implementation of the basic treaty. This will serve as a prop for our countries' presidents, enabling them, on this basis, and via their own consent and their constitutional rights, to facilitate the development of good-neighbourly relations in our countries.

This is a considerable perspective, because I can safely say that the process of the basic treaty's implementation has been closely followed by the international community. This has been demonstrated by the basic treaty's preparatory and ratification processes. I would like to express my satisfaction to your parliament at the fact that on the basis of the basic treaty we have also managed to develop our interparliamentary relations. This has been proved by the fact that several parliamentary committees have held their first meetings. These meetings hold out the prospect of a fruitful dialogue in various areas of common interest.

I would particularly like to welcome the activity of the [words indistinct] Slovak-Hungarian friendship group within the Hungarian Assembly. This group functions literally as an exploratory probe in order to find various opportunities for good relations in future.

Ladies and gentlemen, I am aware of the fact that my speech cannot be a substitute for an act of historical reconciliation, which is certainly lacking so far, and which, after all, is required by the basic treaty and for the present development of political dialogue. I think that urging this step or substituting another solution for this step would not be a wise decision by me, the head of state, and would not help these relations either.

We are facing a period which is certainly necessary for this. During this period, important matters, such as our common effort to join European and transatlantic organizations, will certainly help us. We have applied for EU and NATO membership. Our readiness for cooperation within the EU has to be demonstrated in our mutual and successful cooperation before our admission. I am talking here mainly about our cooperation within the framework of Central European Free Trade Agreement [CEFTA]. This international economic alliance has shown intense activity, which can be seen in several talks at government and expert level. It is also important that these talks have resulted in specific agreements and recommendations for the participants. The citizens of our countries will certainly benefit from the gathering and exchange of practical experiences resulting from our bilateral and multilateral relations.

Concerning Slovak-Hungarian cooperation, I would now like to appreciate all that we have achieved in our bilateral relations. Within a short period after the signing of the basic treaty we can observe a dynamic interministerial cooperation and lively cross-border activities. This must be recognized by the unbiased international community, if its vision is not restricted to the areas of chronic problems in Hungarian-Slovak cooperation.

I am aware that you expect clear words from the Slovak side regarding the problems burdening our bilateral ties, with special regard to the problems related to the life and rights of the ethnic Hungarian citizens living in the Slovak Republic. At this moment I can say, simplifying things somewhat—and other representatives of the Slovak Republic also share this view—that the rights of citizens of Hungarian nationality are protected in Slovakia by our country's democratic constitution as well as by other laws. These rights are also guaranteed

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by several international documents signed by the Slovak Republic.

This is also reflected by the Slovak-Hungarian basic treaty. I would like to stress again that I am convinced that no one in our country threatens these rights.

I have pointed out on several occasions that a law on the official use of minority languages must be adopted as soon as possible, as it is our constitutional obligation toward the national minorities.

Our policy on local communities is linked to this, too. I personally support the idea of self-governments with the most extensive authority at the level of villages and towns, because the self-government organs are those closest to the citizens and they can effectively realize their needs.

I am convinced that in several places the self-governments, owing to the appropriate election of local representatives, can already satisfy the needs of the population, including the national minorities, thereby contributing to the smooth coexistence of citizens of various nationalities. We are not trying to avoid constructive international dialogue to gradually improve the quality of minority rights. [passage omitted]

As head of state, I may not be entitled to speak about certain problems in our bilateral ties, such as the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros hydroelectric dam, but I would like to mention the fact that after the interstate agreement [on joint construction of the dam] was cancelled by one of the sides and the case was brought to the Hague international court, both sides were able to find the appropriate communication and cooperation to avert the consequences of the dispute. [passage omitted]

Esteemed ladies and gentlemen, it is our common interest that a historical reconciliation between Slovakia and Hungary become our common goal in this unique historical period of our country's social, political, and economic transformation. All of us who in the present dynamic times are interested in good-neighborly ties in future must put the utmost effort into this process. Our effort will facilitate the road to our integration in Europe, which professes the universal principles of democracy and contributes to the stability and security of this region.

I am convinced that this can be achieved in the foreseeable future and that this process will not be the sole object of political ambitions and targets. We always have to consider our countries' citizens, whom we have to serve and who are entitled to enjoy the fruits of our labor.

Esteemed president, Mr. speaker, deputies, and guests, I would like to assure you that I will do my best for our understanding and for a genuine reconciliation between the two countries. I will do what my post as president of the Slovak Republic makes it possible to do and what my conscience as a person and citizen tells me to do. Thank you for your attention.

Hungary: Officials Examine Civilian Control Over Army

AU1206175096 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 12 Jun 96 p 9

[Correspondent's report: "Missing Link Between the Army and the Politicians"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Professional circles are conducting almost cutthroat debates on the issue of civilian management and control of the army. Although a constitutional basis for and institutions of civilian control exist, supervision is not always sufficient in everyday practice. An efficient civilian control is one of the basic conditions of NATO membership.

In a democracy the basic condition of civilian control is that the head of state should be the chief commander of the army, basic decisions on defense should be made in parliament, and the army should be well separated from politics. The parliament should determine the basic principles of defense. "The main problem with the basic defense principles currently in force is that they are meaningless," Tamas Wachsler, parliamentary deputy of the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] and member of the parliament's Defense Committee, told us. According to Wachsler, these basic principles emerged as a result of compromises in 1993, and they avoided firm formulations from the outset. "This is the only way to determine the strategy regarding the development of the army, to formulate the possible threats and security threat factors that Hungary might be facing, and to determine the possible scenario and the necessary arms to avoid this," Wachsler said.

However, for the time being the Defense Committee rejected the idea of reformulating the basic principles. "We decided not to touch the basic principles until we can change them radically," Defense Committee Chairman Imre Mecs told us. "One of the big dilemmas of formulating the basic defense principles is how to describe rather concrete tasks without revealing Hungary's strategic secrets," Wachsler pointed out.

We definitely need reformulated basic principles, because the soldiers also often mention the fact that the politicians do not give them sensible tasks. Without this, however, it is impossible to prepare responsible defense

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plans. Wachsler agrees with this: "It is nice to say that Hungary does not have an enemy image, but this is something that cannot be interpreted from a military viewpoint. Thus a situation has emerged in which parliamentary deputies are unaware of the defense plans drawn by soldiers, although in my view approving them requires a political decision," Wachsler pointed out.

According to Colonel Janos Szabo, deputy rector of the Miklos Zrinyi Military Academy, it should also be clarified how to regulate the army's activity, and what should be the jurisdiction of the institutions in charge of civilian control. "Regulations can be stricter, but in a case of danger this could hinder the army commanders in making quick decisions. The authority of political and military decisions should be described precisely, and this is the politicians' task," Janos Szabo told us.

The agreement needed for the changes is delayed for several reasons. According to Wachsler, the lack of confidence between the government and the opposition is bigger than justified, and the ministry apparatus is often unwilling to provide secret information to the members of the Defense Committee. Nor are the relations between the Defense Ministry and the army settled. The Defense Committee is one of the main guarantors of civilian control over the army. "It is very important to properly separate political and military decisions. Politicians should not interfere in professional military issues, and soldiers should not engage in politics," Imre Mecs told us. At the same time, Imre Mecs felt it was a problem that a team of civilian military experts has not yet emerged in Hungary. Mostly soldiers or former professional soldiers are working as "civilians" in the Defense Ministry, and this cannot be called an ideal situation. "In the United States, for example, a retired professional army officer can be employed in the civilian control of the army only after five to 10 years," Imre Mecs pointed out. The white spots of civilian control can also be seen in the cases when, for example, decisions on purchasing Russian T-72 tanks or on deploying MiG aircraft in military exercises in Poland were made without parliamentary approval.

A well-functioning civilian control is essential for NATO membership and, according to Wachsler, NATO is only satisfied with the direction of the change, and not with the situation.

Imre Mecs thinks that the legal framework of civilian control over the army in Hungary is even stricter than the one prevailing in some EU countries, but it would be desirable to further expand the authority of the Defense Committee.

"The main goal of the changes is to develop a system in which the army life does not depend on government changes," Imre Mecs pointed out.

Hungary: Technical Unit Leaving IFOR in Croatia in Dec

LD1206201296 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti has visited the Hungarian technical unit serving as part of the peacekeeping force in Okucani. Our colleague Evelin Forro reports:

[Forro] The Hungarian military leadership expects the Hungarian technical unit to complete its mission on 31 December 1996 in Okucani in Croatia, Gyorgy Keleti told Hungarian Radio after his meeting with the soldiers.

He added that at the moment, everything else is just conjecture. Naturally, if the situation demands the extension of the Ifor [Implementation Force] mandate, negotiations about this can be arranged. First, intergovernmental coordination has to be carried out, then six-party coordination at home, and eventually parliament will have the final say.

Imre Mecs, an Alliance of Free Democrats deputy and chairman of the Parliamentary Defense Committee, in reply to my question, has confirmed that the mandate of the Hungarian technical unit is to expire at the end of the year. However, if an extension is necessary, the Hungarian legislature will be ready to debate this at the end of November. [passage omitted]

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B-H: Bildt Discusses Forthcoming Bosnian Elections

MS1306104996 London THE TIMES in English 13 Jun 96 p 3

[Article by Carl Bildt, high negotiator for Bosnian Peace Agreement: "Bosnia Can Have Free Elections"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Is Dayton a failure? Has the peace process stalled in Bosnia? These will be the questions on people's minds when the governments of the Peace Implementation Council meet in Florence later this week. I have two ways of answering.

One is to compare the newspaper headlines of today with those a year ago. Today I read of disappointments with the peace process, impatience with the pace of economic reconstruction, frustration about those parts of the peace agreement which have not been fully implemented. These criticisms are justified and felt particularly acutely in my office.

But a year ago this week, the top news stories were of UN peacekeepers being held hostage, of the shelling of Sarajevo intensifying, and of preparations for the next offensive by the Bosnian Army to break the siege of Sarajevo—an offensive which failed, incidentally, at the cost of many lives.

It would be an exaggeration to say now that there are as many new cafes opening up every day in Sarajevo as there were shells falling a year ago, but the mood on the streets has been transformed. Hope is in the air here, and in cities across Bosnia.

The other way to answer is to admit quite openly that there is still a very long way to go, further than I hoped six months into the process. Indicted war criminals are still free in many parts of Bosnia. Radovan Karadzic is still poisoning the atmosphere of Bosnian Serb politics. A climate of fear inhibits freedom of movement between the two parts of Bosnia, and it has been darkened by a number of ugly incidents, mostly but not exclusively on the Serb side of the boundary. The media on both sides still use the rhetoric of war, with Pale Television and Radio often churning out propaganda of the most objectionable, Stalinist variety.

However, the worst possible response would be to run up the white flag, say it is all far too difficult, and announce now that there is no point in going through with the elections which are planned within the next three months according to the Dayton timetable.

I am still determined that Karadzic and all of the other indicted war criminals should be tried by the international court. For them, all roads lead to The Hague, and the sooner the better. If Karadzic has a case to put, as he says, he should have the courage and conviction to argue it in person.

But there is a separate provision in the peace agreement, that indicted war criminals are not permitted to hold public office. This is of urgent concern to me, for Karadzic's clinging to office is preventing people from moving on from the psychology of war to the manners and language of peace. We have made some progress, both in making clear to the leadership that Karadzic has to go, and in persuading President Milosevic of Serbia to exert pressure to that end. The Florence meeting must send the message once more.

Elections in Bosnia will be more than usually important. It is of course vital that people have the opportunity to choose their own representatives, to create a new legitimacy. But even more pressing is the task of creating the joint institutions which are the only way of bringing the country together again after years of war. The longer we wait for the elections, the longer the forces of ethnic separation and partition will prevail.

My office cannot force people to live together and cooperate. Nor can 60,000 heavily armed IFOR [Implementation Force] troops, who cannot be expected to remain in anything like such numbers beyond the end of the year. But if we can give Bosnians the opportunity to work together in forging a decent, civilised country, it will be a big achievement.

Of course it is possible that the conditions will be too dreadful, the level of violence and intimidation too high and the media are insufficiently objective for elections worth the name to go ahead. This judgment could still be made by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which will be supervising the elections. But I do not expect that on the basis of what I see in Bosnia today. Ordinary people in each of the communities have a hunger for peace and a deep desire for a return to normality. They realise that ethnic ghettos are not the path of the future. They want to move on. Bosnian politics is coming alive when given the chance, but the Bosnians need reassurance and encouragement.

We in the international community can provide much of that support. A reward for peace in the form of money for reconstruction will help. So will assistance to the media, for instance in the field of television, and my office is already helping to create a new independent network based on existing Bosnian television stations. The continuing contribution of IFOR and the International Police Task Force will also be of the essence if secure conditions are to be assured for anything like normal political life.

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I am not an irrepressible optimist, nor can I afford to be an uncompromising idealist. Bosnia, after all its savagery and sadness, has little room for either. Yet I have seen enough courage, decency and even wisdom here to believe that Bosnia can come through if it is given the chance. We on the outside, like the Bosnians themselves, must show this week that we can stay the course.

B-H: NATO Denies Report on U.S. Troops Encountering Mladic

AU1206130096 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 0748 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 12 June (BETA-REUTER)—NATO and U.S. officials have rejected as "nonsense" and "completely wrong" some reports according to which U.S. units within the Implementation Force [IFOR] in Bosnia encountered Ratko Mladic, Bosnian Serb general, who is indicted for war crimes.

"That report is pure nonsense," the IFOR spokesman in Sarajevo, Major Simon Haselock, stated last night.

He added that "any such incident or anything that the report refers to is out of the question."

Ken Bacon, spokesman of the U.S. Defense Department, said in Washington that the whole story is "completely wrong."

"First, it was not any kind of U.S. patrol, and, second, they did not encounter Mladic," Bacon said.

Haselock's and Bacon's reaction were prompted by reports in some media that U.S. troops had encountered Mladic in the vicinity of the Bosnian Serb Army's General Staff Headquarters near Han Pijesak.

The reports, drawing upon unnamed witnesses, claim that the U.S. soldiers clashed with Serb soldiers until Mladic appeared and ordered the U.S. patrol to go.

"The truth about the whole story is that a Portuguese patrol came across some Bosnian Serb units that were carrying out training, which is prohibited," Haselock stated for the REUTER agency, recalling that, according to the Dayton accord, any military training has to be reported.

He said that the Portuguese soldiers took the Serbs to the headquarters in Han Pijesak.

On that occasion, there were no clashes, and Mladic was neither seen nor heard to threaten the Americans in any way, Haselock said.

B-H: Karadzic Reportedly Reinforces 'Security Guard'

AU1306131296 (Clandestine) Krajina Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Radio Deutsche Welle claims to have learned in Pale that Serb Republic President Radovan Karadzic has reinforced his security guard, while the U.S. IFOR [Implementation Force] members have reinforced their patrols between Pale and Han Pijesak.

B-H: IFOR Nordic Brigade Confiscates Serb Antitank Gun

LD1206134696 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1210 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Doboj, 12 June (SRNA)—IFOR [Implementation Force] soldiers have confiscated a [Bosnian] Serb army antitank vehicle, a modified self-propelled gun, in the vicinity of Teslic, according to Pasi Karonen, an officer of IFOR's Nordic Brigade, in Doboj today. Karonen did not give any other details.

Representatives of the Nordic brigade headquarters confirmed that a number of traffic accidents involving civilian and IFOR vehicles has taken place recently in its zone of operation.

"The headquarters has issued additional warnings to IFOR soldiers, instructing them to drive more carefully in order to reduce the risk of traffic accidents now that the number of vehicles on the roads is increasing."

B-H: NATO To Assist OSCE in Preparing for Elections

AU1206125396 Paris AFP in English 1232 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels, June 12 (AFP)—NATO agreed Wednesday to boost the aid its peace-keeping force in Bosnia provides to the organization preparing elections in the republic, a NATO official said.

The elections are due to be held by mid-September. They are being prepared by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE].

"We cannot miss these elections, which are the best hope for the future," the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

No firm date has been decided for the voting, but one could be announced Thursday at an international conference on Bosnia being held in Florence, Italy.

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NATO ambassadors meeting Wednesday decided that IFOR [Implementation Force], the NATO force in Bosnia, will play a key role in assuring that the elections are conducted in a safe environment, the official said.

Specifically, NATO troops will boost their presence in hotspot areas, guarantee freedom of movement for voters and protect OSCE workers and the 4,000 polling stations they plan to set up.

And assuming it will take 10 days to count all the ballots and declare a final result, NATO will guard polling stations and the vote-counting process during that period.

He said NATO believed it would take three days to count ballots cast in Bosnia and a week to collect those of Bosnian refugees abroad, mainly in Germany, Denmark and Sweden.

B-H: Pressure Exerted for Free, Fair Elections

MS1306105896 London THE GUARDIAN in English 13 Jun 96 p 19

[Article by Jonathan Steele: "Hidden Protectors"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In the chaotic army or outside advisers which has doubled and trebled in Bosnia since peace was imposed, no group is more worried than the European Union's men in Mostar. The Chablis is chilled. The terrace is shaded. But the roofless wrecks of houses at the end of their hotel garden are a constant warning that almost nothing has been done to re-build shattered communities and broken lives.

And deadlines are looming. While ministers meet in Florence this week, exactly halfway through the one-year mandate which Nato set when the Dayton peace accords were signed, what concerns the men of Mostar is not whether foreign forces will pull out in December. Their priority is the Mostar city elections in a fortnight's time.

How, in short, are they going to avoid a bloody "battle of the buses" when thousands of refugees and displaced people try to reverse ethnic cleansing and go home to vote in defiance of the thugs? What are they going to do if NATO's peace implementation force, IFOR [Implementation Force], maintains its pusillanimous refusal to get involved in policing or crowd control?

The international spotlight constantly hovers over the indicted Bosnian Serb war criminals, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, and whether IFOR will try to enforce their arrest. They are the symbols of ethnic cleansing. The substance is their victims, and the picture is grim. Only 100,000 of the 2.4 million displaced people from the Bosnian war have gone home since the Dayton accord. Almost all went back to areas where their ethnic compatriots are in a majority. Few dared to cross the newly created ethnic divides.

The refugees' hesitation is understandable, given the lack of protection the outside world has been willing to give. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees has tried to bring small groups of displaced people home, taking building materials with them to help to repair their ruined houses. But the UNHCR is not in the policing business, and when it has faced resistance, it has had to retreat.

In the pre-Dayton days when the outside force in Bosnia was the United Nations Protection Force, UNPROFOR, it was often labelled UNPROFOR-PROFOR. It spent more time protecting itself than Bosnia's civilians. Now we have the same with IFOR. Pledged to restore freedom of movement in Bosnia, it has mainly succeeded in creating freedom of movement for its own vehicles. They trundle up and down Bosnia's roads with varying degrees of paranoia. The Americans insist on nothing less than four vehicles at a time, their drivers sweating it out in flak jackets and helmets.

Their camps are almost invisible behind mounds of sandbags while ferocious bumps across the road outside the gates bring traffic to a virtual halt. The British are more relaxed behind their simple chicken wire, yet so far all nations agree on staying out of the refugee-protection business.

They are willing to help transit travellers by ensuring that no paramilitary roadblocks pop up. Buses now ply from Bosnia to Croatia through Serb territory without trouble. The problem is when people want to go home to stay, or even—as in the case of Mostar—just to cast their votes. The word in military circles is that "we can't put a tank outside every door." It is an argument taken to the absurd. All that is needed is for IFOR to take a more assertive role and protect at least some groups of refugees.

Which brings the case back to the divided city of Mostar. Elections are being held early under the agreement which the Americans brokered between the Croats and the Bosnians in February 1994, while the war with the Bosnian Serbs still raged. If the accords on Mostar were a foretaste of Dayton, the city's elections in two weeks' time will be a foretaste of the ones due for the whole of Bosnia in September.

Like Dayton, the accord on Mostar talked of unity and partition in the same breath leaving it to the implementers to decide which they preferred. Mostar was drawn into three Bosnian-majority and three Croat-majority areas with a central council under joint control.

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Most of the 50,000 people who lost their homes were Muslims and now they wish to go back to vote. Some will come from across the river, others will wish to drive from other parts of Bosnia, and a few may even come from Britain and other European countries. Security officials fear bloodshed and killings. "It is an enormous worry," says Sir Martin Garrod, the British general who is the EU chief of staff in Mostar. "There are real fears for the safety of candidates as they campaign, for voters who want to cross the city to cast their ballots in their old home districts, and for refugees on the buses which will be coming to Mostar."

The security nightmare for the Mostar poll has highlighted another flaw in Dayton. The EU is paying the local election officials in Mostar. By contrast, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe [OSCE], which is running the Bosnia-wide poll, has told the governments of the two "entities" in Bosnia to pay their election officials themselves. Dozens of judges and lawyers who had volunteered to register voters resigned on hearing the news, casting new doubt on whether the massive operation to register voters can be completed in time.

The Americans are putting heavy pressure on the OSCE to declare that conditions exist for a free and fair election. In many parts of Bosnia this is hard to accept. So is it yes or no? For those opposition parties which stand for a re-united country, it is a hard dilemma. Most would like the elections to go ahead. Some fear that if they are delayed once, it may be for ever. Others argue that the election provides a civic space within which pluralist politics can revive after the vacuum of

The best way to resolve the dilemma would be to link the poll to the return of refugees. Let the OSCE declare that elections can be held only in those municipalities where refugees can start going home, and let Ifor come out of its barracks and supply the necessary protection. This would give credibility to the election exercise, show that the international community does not accept permanent partition, and put the victims of the war in centre stage again.

The good news is that IFOR has begun to plan for another year in Bosnia, after the Dayton mandate runs out, with or without some American participation. But what nationality IFOR's contingents are is less important than what they do with their time. Another year in barracks would be a waste. Soldiers are there to defend civilians, not themselves.

B-H: Report Views Provisions of Oslo Accord

AU1206101196 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 9 Jun 96 p 9

[Article by Frane Plancic: "American Tanks for Bosnia-Herzegovina"]

[FBIS Translated Text] By the end of this year, according to the U.S. program of sales of surplus weapons, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army will be able to purchase a large quantity of weapons at low prices from the United States. It has already been determined that there will be 45 tanks (updated versions of the M-46), 80 armored personnel carriers (the M-113), 15 helicopters (combat helicopters AH-1 and transport helicopters UH-1), approximately 50,000 guns (M-16), and a small number of missiles, though aircraft have not been mentioned.

It is all part of the previously planned $100 million in aid for Bosnia-Herzegovina, which depends on the implementation of the Dayton peace agreement. The second condition is that the arms embargo on states of the former Yugoslavia be lifted. Both conditions, politically deeply intertwined, will be fulfilled on 11 June: The UN Security Council will lift the embargo, and the contract on controlled arms, as regulated by the Dayton plan, will be signed by Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the FRY in Oslo on the same day.

The Contract on Subregional Arms Control is a result of the Vienna negotiations between Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the FRY about the controlled arming of the three states and limited possession of heavy—potentially assault—weapons of five categories. The categories include tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, aircraft, and helicopters. The signatory states will have limited quantities of those weapons at their disposal, the numbers being those reported by the FRY and then reduced by 25 percent. Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina will each have 30 percent of the resulting number, and thus we get the well-known Dayton ratio of 5:2:2.

We have found out that the FRY reported the data on the number of combat aircraft as enabling it to keep (minus 25 percent) 155. According to that, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina will each be allowed about 60. Inasmuch as Croatia is reported to have only five, we have the opportunity to purchase about another 50 aircraft. Accordingly, Croatia is in the process of arming itself (with modern aircraft, naturally), while Serbia is in the process of disarming (and is burdened by worn-out equipment). The same goes for the other categories of heavy weaponry.

The logical question is whether 60 modern Croatian aircraft are worth more than 155 worn-out Serbian

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ones. Moreover, does that balance of power bring more security for Croatia?

The numbers do not give a proper answer because they have been roughly worked out from a wider strategic context. According to the simplest interpretation, should 1,000 Serbian tanks attack, we can count on 800 tanks to defend Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as those states have been defined as allies by the Dayton agreement. The intention behind the proportion was to offer a poor chance of success for any aggressor.

However, another complication in these numbers is that the 400 tanks in Bosnia-Herzegovina are further divided: the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army get a third each, and a third goes to the army of the Serb Republic. We could calculate for days on end were it not for other contents of the Oslo agreement that merit attention. Those are confidence- and security-building measures and other guarantees for Croatia, while Serbia will not be given anything of that kind as long as the present regime is in power.

[Box, p 9]

Balance of Power

Sixteen months after 1 July 1996, the signatories to the Contract will be allowed to possess up to, but not exceed, the following numbers of heavy weapons:

Croatia: 410 tanks, 340 armored personnel carriers, 1,500 artillery pieces, 52 combat aircraft, and 21 combat helicopters.

Bosnia-Herzegovina: Same numbers, but in the ratio of two for the Federation and one for the Serb Republic.

FRY: 1,025 tanks, 850 armored personnel carriers, 3,750 pieces of artillery, 155 combat aircraft, and 53 combat helicopters.

Statements about the voluntary limits on the maximum numbers of troops after 1 July of this year have also been issued. Bosnia-Herzegovina will have 60,000 troops, Croatia 65,000, the FRY 124,339, the Federation 55,000, and the Serb Republic 56,000 soldiers.

B-H: Prlic Expects Arms Accord To Be Signed by 20 Jun

AU1206190096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 12 Jun 96

[Statement by Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Jadranko Prlic on 12 June; place not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] In spite of all the efforts invested in Oslo, we did not manage to sign the agreement on [words indistinct] arsenals of the three states that emerged in the region of the former Yugoslavia. [Words indistinct] two entities within Bosnia-Herzegovina. Five signatures were needed for the agreement, and we failed to do that. However, [words indistinct]. All that constitutes an integral part of the agreement—it contains some 90 pages—has been coordinated with many concessions, compromises, and so forth; only the first sentence in the agreement was not coordinated, and it represents a [word indistinct] political issue. Namely, pursuant to the annex on which the agreement is based [words indistinct] five parties. The Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation requested that a distinction be made between the five parties, that is, that a difference be made between the three states as signatories of the agreement, and the two entities that are also to sign the agreement. [Words indistinct] that five parties should sign the agreement, and (?the Foreign Ministry) [words indistinct] for as long as we do not have the agreement of all relevant parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

We agreed in the morning to freeze the situation, [words indistinct] negative consequences that [words indistinct]. We stopped the clock a minute before midnight, and the negative consequences [words indistinct]. The negative consequences would mean far lower limits, and they would mean that provisions which would have automatically gone into force will not go into force. One such provision is the lifting of the ban on arms imports [words indistinct] is the beginning of the Federation army's Train and Equip Program. The conclusion is that the (?situation) is to remain frozen until the agreement is signed, that is, in the next seven days, that is, by 20 June.

We will try to find a satisfactory solution and sign the agreement during the Florence conference. The agreement is exceptionally important for the stabilization of not only Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also the general region.

B-H: British Colonel Says Control of Arms Going Well

LD1206161796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1529 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pale, June 12 (TANJUG)—Control of the quantity of arms in the (Bosnian Serb State) Republika Srpska units is going well, British Lt. Col. Mick Akons, who heads a team of inspectors, said Wednesday.

Akons said the implementation of the Dayton Peace accords for Bosnia-Herzegovina had so far been successful, saying this was the initial step towards peace in the future.

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Romanian Lt. Col. Gabriel Siorobea said he shared Akons's view. Siorobea and Akons met with head of the R.S. Army team of inspectors, Lt. Col. Mica Milicevic, in Pale late on Tuesday. Siorobea said all three formerly warring parties—Moslems, Croats and Serbs—had exchanged information about arms and equipment on time, and said teams of inspectors were much better prepared for their task now.

Milicevic said Akons's team had had the opportunity to check that reports sent by the R.S. Army on the quantity of arms in its units had been correct.

The R.S. Army has again shown that it fully meets all conditions it pledges to or signs, Milicevic said. He said the R.S. Army expected other parties to do so as well.

Akons's team includes also Bosnian Moslem and Croat Army officers.

B-H: FRY Intelligence Activities in Bosnia Viewed

AU1206195696 Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian 3 Jun 96 p 6

[Article by Djuro Kozar: "Call Aca for Espionage"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A citizen who demanded to remain anonymous asked the author of this text if it were possible that the officers of KOS [Yugoslav intelligence service] could still be present in Sarajevo. He said that he could swear that he had recognized one of them on Titova Street, a man he had known before the war, only that now he was wearing civilian clothes and a moustache. When he realized that he had been discovered, the agent started to say something in English, and then quickly disappeared among the people on the street....

Pretending To Be English

There is no reason not to believe this. The territory of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is open, it can be entered rather liberally, and it is sure that, together with people who have good intentions and foreigners, we are also visited by those who have no good intentions and who only pretend to be English. The presence of KOS officers in the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina can be interpreted as an intelligence breakthrough by this agency, the center of which is in the Serb Republic, only a few kilometers away from the mentioned street in Sarajevo.

The counterintelligence service of the Yugoslav army, which already during the war carried out a sort of occupation of the Serb entity, has intensified its work since the Dayton agreement. Its agents are professionals who have spent most of their intelligence careers in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but there are probably some new faces as well. Their objective is to make an intelligence study of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and at that they are particularly interested in the part controlled by the legal authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Their intelligence interest was witnessed by prisoners who were interrogated by KOS agents in Pale, Foca, Bijeljina, and other places in the Serb Republic—Namik Berberovic, Ibran Mustafic, Hidajet Delic, Vladimir Santic, Ivan Stjepanovic, and others. According to the testimonies of those people, who went through the interrogation of the KOS, the agents tried to acquire intelligence data, and when they were unsuccessful in that they used to resort to brutal force.

General Wears Jeans

Agents did not reveal their real names in the presence of the prisoners, instead calling each other by rank, "boss," or only nicknames and pronouns like "he," "that one," and so on. If somebody important came to the interrogation, the prisoners felt that, because the interrogators would become nervous and tidied up the rooms in which they were. The only thing that could not be hidden were the consequences of their methods of interrogation....

It seems that the photo journalist for BH PRESS, Delic, was interrogated by the head of KOS, Aleksandar Dimitrijevic, a general major in the Army of Yugoslavia. He did not say his name, and was wearing a leather jacket and jeans, but judging by the special respect, Delic had the impression that it was the leading man of KOS who was before him then. When the general left, the interrogators needed two days to calm down and continue the interrogation.

KOS head Dimitrijevic is a typical example of the school of his predecessor, retired General Aca Vasiljevic. He was staying in Sarajevo in summer 1991, when in the Military Court some men from Split were tried for the murder of one and the attempted strangling of another soldier in the JNA [[Yugoslav People's Army] in front of the command building of the war navy in Split. He was dressed leisurely, and said that he was a TANJUG journalist from Belgrade. Other journalists found it strange that he did not send any reports to his agency, and to the question of why he was not writing anything, he said that he worked for a weekly military bulletin of TANJUG, and would write the article about that trial in Belgrade.

The author of this text later found out that Dimitrijevic was not a journalist, but (at that time) a JNA colonel who worked in KOS, whose identity and activities were top secrets. He often travelled to all the republics of the former Yugoslavia "on business," under different names,

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and always with one ear listening to what was being said at the next table. Who knows where and how that KOS officer was trained for conspiratorial work? One is certain: Milosevic trusts him, otherwise he would not be on this post.

Questions Without Answers

Talking with one of the prisoners who were interrogated by KOS, we could find out what that counterintelligence service is most interested in. There are three groups of things about which they want to know as much as possible.

The first is the situation in the Bosniak national corpus, and within that the policy of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA], the health of President Alija Izetbegovic, the intentions of Haris Silajdzic [former prime minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, now opposition leader], the ties between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Islamic countries, and so on. Second, relations within the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and within that their attention is directed on negotiations between the SDA and the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], the relationship between Kresimir Zubak [president of the Federation] and Ejup Ganic [vice president of the Federation], between Bosniaks and Croats, and between the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the Croatian Defense Council [HVO]. The third group of questions refers to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, its organization, armament and morale, and there they are particularly interested in the demobilization and the army's future work.

Agents could get no answers to these questions, as the prisoners knew who they were dealing with and mostly answered with "I do not know," "that is not known to me," or they were silent. The KOS officers would then usually change their questions, but they got the same answers. That would enrage the interrogators, and they would then hit the prisoners and threaten them with monstrous accusations and liquidation.

They even sentenced HVO officer Ivan Stjepanovic to death, trying to break him in that way. They expected that he, as an officer, would tell them a lot, but he did not tell them what they wanted to know.

They intentionally did not want to administer the sentence on him, counting on time. When they definitely gave him up, they left him for an exchange—"a colonel for a colonel." Stjepanovic was exchanged, but he is still in hospital suffering from the consequences of torture.

The citizens of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina who go to the Serb Republic for various reasons, risking not being able to return, are also of interest to the KOS officers. One woman recently complained that in Sokolac she had been interrogated for hours only because she had the same last name as one Bosnian official.

Four Serbs from Tuzla were immediately arrested and transferred to Brcko to be given "permits for movement" as soon as they got to the Serb entity near the corridor. In fact, that was a way of exposing them to questions—from those concerning the situation in Tuzla, to attempts to find out some details about the 2d Corps [of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army]. The frightened people, mostly over 60 years old, swore that they knew nothing about what they were asked, and the agent responded: "What sort of Serbs are you?"

The Wrong Man

At the end of May, in the Bijelo Polje marketplace in Lukavica, KOS officers came across a smuggler from Sarajevo who seemed interesting to them in terms of intelligence. However, the man did not even know the name of his next-door neighbor, let alone that of the commander of the General Staff of the 1st Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army!

Realizing that they had the wrong man, they threatened him with the following words: "If we catch you once again, and you still know nothing—you will have a hard time."

It is certain that KOS will direct its activities to the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina even more in the future, and that its agents will come here personally to conduct the special war. In order to prevent the activities of KOS it is necessary to be alert in every place, and to maintain a 'safety culture.' The AID [Agency for Research and Documentation], whose role and competence some are trying to dispute, is also necessary.

[Box, p 6]

Tolimir Leads KOS

The head of KOS in the army of the Serb Republic is General Zdravko Tolimir. He is never introduced like that, though, but as the assistant to the commander of the Main Staff of the Army of the Serb Republic. At the same time he is the negotiator for that army with IFOR [Implementation Force].

Tolimir's deputy is Colonel Komnen Zarkovic, and his assistant Colonel Petar Simovic.

Two special units are directly subordinate to KOS in the army of the Serb Republic: One is commanded by Colonel Milenko Lazic and is located in Han Pijesak, and the other is led by Dragan Samardzic and is stationed in the barracks in Kalinovik.

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B-H: Vice President Ganic on Obstacles to Peace

MM1306132096 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 9-15 Jun 96 p 16

[Interview with Bosnian Vice President Ejup Ganic by Taj-al-Din 'Abd-al-Haqq in Abu Dhabi; date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] ['Abd-al-Haqq] The Dayton Bosnian peace agreement is facing obstacles. Does this mean that there is a danger that war might start again?

[Ganic] There is both a military and a civilian aspect to the Dayton agreement. The ceasefire has been achieved, but the civilian aspect is being ignored by the Serbs. They are preventing the refugees from returning to their homes and land. They also refuse to hand over the war criminals responsible for the mass extermination campaigns.

['Abd-al-Haqq] Could these obstacles facing the implementation of the civilian aspect lead to a new confrontation?

[Ganic] The Dayton agreement is an international agreement, and the international community must push for its implementation. As long as there are obstacles to implementation, the danger is always present.

['Abd-al-Haqq] Once again, does this mean that war could start anew?

[Ganic] My question is : Could there have been peace in Europe if Hitler had remained in power and been able to visit Paris, for example? The war criminals wanted by the International Court are alive and carrying on with their lives as officials without any problems. That is why, under the circumstances, we cannot imagine that we have achieved peace.

['Abd-al-Haqq] A donors' conference has been held in Brussels to collect contributions for rebuilding Bosnia. What have these efforts been able to achieve?

[Ganic] The donors' conference pledged to provide $1.2 billion, but we have received nothing yet. Consequently, we are trying to obtain aid, loans, and investments in order to rebuild. We have many projects requiring financing, in addition to having a dynamic work force.

['Abd-al-Haqq] What about retraining the Bosnian Armed Forces?

[Ganic] There is a program for retraining our armed forces in order to achieve a balance with the Serbian forces. The United States has promised to provide $100 million for this purpose, and we are having talks with the other states, with a view to completing the program. Arab and Islamic states are among those with which we are having talks.

['Abd-al-Haqq] What kind of military assistance are you requesting?

[Ganic] Assistance in buying equipment or providing opportunities for training. We now have trainees in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and some Islamic states.

['Abd-al-Haqq] Among the conditions set out in Dayton is the need to expel the so-called Afghan fighters. Has anything been done to that end?

[Ganic] We have said from the start that we do not need more forces because we already have 250,000 fighters. In fact, all we need is equipment. The mujahidin who came to Bosnia during the war left once the agreement was ratified because we told them that the Bosnian war was our war and we did not want anyone to die for us or become a martyr on our behalf.

['Abd-al-Haqq] How do you envisage your future relations with Europe?

[Ganic] We are part of and at the heart of Europe. Our presence here will give an indication of how Europe interacts with the Islamic world. We are determined to remain part of Europe. However, we are also determined to keep our Islamic identity, and we will try to reinforce that identity by extensively introducing Arabic in our ways. We will also teach about the Serbs' atrocities and mass extermination.

B-H: Federation Assembly Passes Law on War Criminals

LD1206203796 Sarajevo BH PRESS in Serbo-Croatian 1753 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 12 Jun (BH PRESS)—The federation's parliament has approved a law which sets out procedures for the handing over of people against whom charges have been brought in the international tribunal for serious violations of international humanitarian law on the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.

The essential point is that procedures for handing someone over are initiated at the request of the international tribunal, via diplomatic channels, and that a decision on this is made by the Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Deputies Muhamed Imamovic and Ejub Hodzic believe that this law falls within the remit of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but the parliament accepted the explanation of Kasim Begic according to which the procedure for handing someone over is a specific obligation of the Federation arising out of the Dayton Agreement, and does not interfere with the authority of Bosnia-Herzegovina as defined in the constitution.

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The assembly decided to approve a draft law on the privatization agency, the basic function of which is to carry out specialist and other tasks in connection with privatization.

A draft law on the organizational details and remit of the tax system in the federation was also approved.

The constituent assembly adjourned today's session at about 1900 and it is scheduled to resume at 1000 tomorrow.

Before the beginning of tomorrow's constituent assembly session, the commission for the coat of arms and flag, which should come up with solutions for the federation's coat of arms and flag, is expected to meet.

B-H: Federation Assembly Approves Draft Law on Cantons

LD1206222996 Sarajevo BH PRESS in Serbo-Croatian 1758 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 12 Jun (BH PRESS)—Today's session of the Constituent Assembly of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation approved, among other things, a draft law on federal units, cantons, and counties, and a draft law on the Banking Agency of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. This latter law establishes the Banking Agency which will have the basic task of issuing permits to banks in order to allow them to operate, and supervising banks' operations in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. [passage omitted]

B-H: Bosniaks, Croats Said Closer to Agreement on Army

AU1306115396 Paris AFP in English 1130 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, June 13 (AFP)—Moslems and Croats in Bosnia are a step closer to reaching an agreement on a united federal army, the defence minister of the Moslem-Croat Federation said here. Vladimir Soljic, a Croat, told AFP that the Federation Parliament was on the verge of approving the bill, following weeks of ethnic wrangling.

"There is a good chance that the law will be approved during this parliament session," he said, insisting that Croats and Moslems had reached a solution on their two main subjects of discord.

While the Moslems were in favour of a unified army without an ethnic identity, the minority Croats wanted protection for their ethnic identity within a "unified" army.

According to Soljic, conscripts will be allowed to choose in which units they want to serve, a move which will satisfy Croats who wish to draw a line between the mostly-Moslem army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croat troops.

"It is natural for a Croat not to want to serve in the Bosnian army if his brother or his father has been killed by the Bosnian army," Soljic said.

The Federation was created in March 1994 under the auspices of the United States, after two years of intense fighting between Croats and Moslems in Bosnia.

The embargo on the delivery of heavy arms to the former Yugoslavia, imposed by the UN Security Council in September 1991, ended on Wednesday 180 days after the signature of the Bosnian peace accords on December 14 last year.

US military aid to the Federation is conditional on the unification of the two armies, and military aid is expected to flow into Bosnia-Herzegovina once the integration begins.

Both factions of the Moslem-Croat Federation agreed earlier this week to merge their respective armies, but there is still a lot of distrust between the two.

"When fewer Croats and Moslems want to serve in the units of their respective communities, it will be proof that relations within the Federation have improved," said the defence minister.

A Moslem demand for greater political control over the military was also approved, the minister said.

The passing of the bill on a unified army is doubly important because the US has promised in exchange 100 million dollars in military aid as part of a planned 800-million-dollar equip-and-train programme.

James Pardew, the US official dealing with military relations in Bosnia, has been here during the past few days to help resolve differences between Croats and Moslems.

The US has asked that Bosnia be cleared of its last foreign Islamic fighters, including Iranians, the State Department said.

Soljic said part of the equipment promised by the US had already been singled out and the rest would follow soon.

"It is new equipment, but not the most recent technology. It will be sufficiently up-to-date and mostly American," said Soljic.

The defence minister said the first deliveries could take place a month after the passing of the bill on a unified federal army and the confirmation by Washington of the departure of all foreign fighters.

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Asked whether rearming would not provide Croats and Moslems with an excuse to settle old scores, the minister said efforts would be made to avoid possible flare-ups.

B-H: Embassy in Croatia To Facilitate Voting for Mostar Refugees

AU1106172896 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 11 Jun 96

[Report by Nada al Issa—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the occasion of the coming elections in Mostar, the Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to Croatia will organize transport to polling stations for all the citizens of Mostar who are living in Croatia as refugees. The embassy will help them register on election rolls. BH PRESS Zagreb correspondent Nada al Issa has the details.

[al Issa] All the associations of Mostar refugees in Croatia are supposed to compile lists of voters and dispatch them to the Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Zagreb. Registration may be done individually, as well, and applications are needed for the embassy to secure transportation to Mostar for all those who so desire. In concluding this report, we shall give a telephone number you can dial, so get a piece of paper and a pencil ready. Persons not registered on voters' lists will not be able to vote, so it is in the interests of all Mostar citizens who want to cast a vote for a unified city to report to the Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Zagreb, and, if possible, by 15 June. Any document with personal data and a photograph attached can be submitted for the purpose of identification during the registration. The Consular Section of the Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Zagreb will on that occasion speed up the process for obtaining travel documents for all Mostar voters. Information on this can be obtained from the following telephone numbers at the Bosnia-Herzegovina Consulate in Zagreb: 6156505 or 6156502. I shall repeat the phone numbers: 6156505 or 6156502. For other information about organized transportation to Mostar, dial the following embassy phone number: 449655 or 434678. According to official information from the Croatian Government, there are 3,000 Mostar refugees, both Croats and Bosniaks, currently living in Croatia.

B-H: SDA 'Regrets' Exclusion of Joint List From Mostar Election

AU1206152396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Party of Democratic Action [SDA] regrets that, due to errors in procedures, the participation of the joint list of five opposition parties—namely the Social Democratic Party, the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats, the Muslim Bosniak Organization, the Croatian Peasant's Party, and the Republican Party—in the Mostar elections on 30 June alongside other parties has been called in question.

However, we condemn (words indistinct) misrepresenting their own omission, due to a lack of coordination between the five parties, to register in time with the electoral commission in Mostar, after which they tried to hush up the issue and put the blame on others. Despite this, guided by Mostar's interests, the SDA appeals to the EU Administration in Mostar to accept the (word indistinct) list of the five parties' coalition and thereby enable it to take part in the Mostar elections on 30 June of this year.

B-H: Mostar Mayor Appeals to Casado To Accept Joint List

AU1206190796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 12 Jun 96

[Report by Halil Sefka]

[FBIS Translated Text] After the Mostar Electoral Commission failed to accept the Joint List of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a coordination list of five opposition parties, eastern Mostar Mayor Safet Orucevic wrote to EU Mostar Administrator Ricardo Peres Casado.

[Sefka] The forthcoming elections in Mostar are an exceptionally important political event for the peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is why I am surprised that reasons of a formal nature [words indistinct] can be an obstacle to participation in elections for the city and municipal councils. Thus, I appeal to you to do everything—and you can do that—to see that the opposition bloc is allowed to participate in the Mostar elections. The participation of these parties can only be an advantage for the Mostar citizens, who must be given the chance to elect political parties and candidates of their own free will. We reject the possibility of formal reasons—intentionally or otherwise—casting a shadow over the forthcoming local elections in the city. The most important result of the Mostar elections is already known: Mostar will be an integral city, and that is why it is important for citizens to elect to the city and municipal councils the candidates whom they trust, reads the letter addressed by Mayor Safet Orucevic to Administrator Casado.

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[al Issa] All the associations of Mostar refugees in Croatia are supposed to compile lists of voters and dispatch them to the Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Zagreb. Registration may be done individually, as well, and applications are needed for the embassy to secure transportation to Mostar for all those who so desire. In concluding this report, we shall give a telephone number you can dial, so get a piece of paper and a pencil ready. Persons not registered on voters' lists will not be able to vote, so it is in the interests of all Mostar citizens who want to cast a vote for a unified city to report to the Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Zagreb, and, if possible, by 15 June. Any document with personal data and a photograph attached can be submitted for the purpose of identification during the registration. The Consular Section of the Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Zagreb will on that occasion speed up the process for obtaining travel documents for all Mostar voters. Information on this can be obtained from the following telephone numbers at the Bosnia-Herzegovina Consulate in Zagreb: 6156505 or 6156502. I shall repeat the phone numbers: 6156505 or 6156502. For other information about organized transportation to Mostar, dial the following embassy phone number: 449655 or 434678. According to official information from the Croatian Government, there are 3,000 Mostar refugees, both Croats and Bosniaks, currently living in Croatia.

B-H: SDA 'Regrets' Exclusion of Joint List From Mostar Election

AU1206152396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Party of Democratic Action [SDA] regrets that, due to errors in procedures, the participation of the joint list of five opposition parties—namely the Social Democratic Party, the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats, the Muslim Bosniak Organization, the Croatian Peasant's Party, and the Republican Party—in the Mostar elections on 30 June alongside other parties has been called in question.

However, we condemn (words indistinct) misrepresenting their own omission, due to a lack of coordination between the five parties, to register in time with the electoral commission in Mostar, after which they tried to hush up the issue and put the blame on others. Despite this, guided by Mostar's interests, the SDA appeals to the EU Administration in Mostar to accept the (word indistinct) list of the five parties' coalition and thereby enable it to take part in the Mostar elections on 30 June of this year.

B-H: Mostar Mayor Appeals to Casado To Accept Joint List

AU1206190796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 12 Jun 96

[Report by Halil Sefka]

[FBIS Translated Text] After the Mostar Electoral Commission failed to accept the Joint List of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a coordination list of five opposition parties, eastern Mostar Mayor Safet Orucevic wrote to EU Mostar Administrator Ricardo Peres Casado.

[Sefka] The forthcoming elections in Mostar are an exceptionally important political event for the peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is why I am surprised that reasons of a formal nature [words indistinct] can be an obstacle to participation in elections for the city and municipal councils. Thus, I appeal to you to do everything—and you can do that—to see that the opposition bloc is allowed to participate in the Mostar elections. The participation of these parties can only be an advantage for the Mostar citizens, who must be given the chance to elect political parties and candidates of their own free will. We reject the possibility of formal reasons—intentionally or otherwise—casting a shadow over the forthcoming local elections in the city. The most important result of the Mostar elections is already known: Mostar will be an integral city, and that is why it is important for citizens to elect to the city and municipal councils the candidates whom they trust, reads the letter addressed by Mayor Safet Orucevic to Administrator Casado.

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Asked whether rearming would not provide Croats and Moslems with an excuse to settle old scores, the minister said efforts would be made to avoid possible flare-ups.

B-H: Embassy in Croatia To Facilitate Voting for Mostar Refugees

AU1106172896 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 11 Jun 96

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Croatia: Capljina Muslim Refugees Say Croats Not Allowing Return

LD1206214396 Sarajevo Radio Hajat in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Presidency of the municipality of Capljina calls for an end to the construction of a housing estate on the left bank of the River Neretva in the municipality of Capljina for Croat refugees from central Bosnia and Croats who fled from Konjic to Capljina, by which an attempt is being made to change the demographic structure of the municipality and legitimize ethnic cleansing, which is at odds with the Dayton Agreement and all other agreements.

Expressing its surprise at this act, the Presidency of the municipality of Capljina today sent a letter to Carl Bildt's office, the UNHCR, federal and republican governments, demanding that urgent steps are taken for the return of Bosniaks from Capljina to their homes. Bosniak refugees from Capljina and their legitimate institutions have shown extreme cooperativeness in setting up an interim municipal council of Capljina; the same goes for everything else that has been achieved, signed, and agreed so far.

However, should the local Capljina authorities continue to obstruct the process of return, and should the international community fail to take energetic measures to rectify the situation, it will be hard to control further actions of the Bosniak refugees from Capljina.

Croatia: Serbs Want Revenue From Djeletovci Oil Field

AU0706170096 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1610 GMT 5 Jun 96

[Unattributed report—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Executive Council of the Serb District of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem held a session in Bilje yesterday. Many current political, social, and economic issues were discussed, and several important decisions were adopted. The report that follows conveys part of the atmosphere at the session.

[Unidentified correspondent] The first part of yesterday's session in Bilje involved the pilot program for the registration of pensioners in Darda. This being an extremely important topic, UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] representatives, headed by (?Graham Day), head of the (?Erdut) part of the civilian sector of the UNTAES, were also invited to the session.

Dr. Stanimirovic, president of the Executive Council, and Vaso Zigic, president of the Executive Council of Beli Manastir municipality, gave the introductory speeches.

Zigic reported to government members and other people present that, in accordance with the agreements reached in Osijek and Beli Manastir, in which Gerard Fisher, the number one man in charge of UNTAES civilian affairs, directly participated, the Darda community was to be a model for the registration of pensioners in this area. However, the process turned out to be different from what had been agreed and was in danger of turning into something that may jeopardize everything that had been achieved.

[Stanimirovic] The currency in which it would be done has not been agreed upon, and we did not approve of the Croatian side coming here, taking photographs, and filling out forms for their birth certificates and certificates of citizenship. It was agreed—we did get that document [words indistinct] from the Croatian side, and UNTAES accepted it without having (?consulted us).

[Unidentified correspondent] On the basis of a one-sided decision, on 28 May, UNTAES and a team from the Osijek pension and disability insurance fund registered the pensioners by taking their photographs. Each pensioner who responded to the UNTAES appeal had to fill out a form [words indistinct] supposed to get the certificate of citizenship, and, after that, probably (?collect the pension money).

The registration in Darda did not include the pensioners who arrived in this area after 1991 or those who achieved the pension rights afterwards. The Beli Manastir Municipal Assembly demanded of the UNTAES that the registration process in Darda be suspended in order to prevent incidents.

[Stanimirovic] There were some heavy arguments between the UNTAES representatives on the one hand and Mr. Zigic and I on the other—our position was that everything must be coordinated with us rather than being done exclusively at the insistence of the Croatian side.

[Unidentified correspondent] Other government members also took part in the discussion. Mr. Vojin Susa said that the Croatians were offered an accurate and [word indistinct] list of those who have pension rights or will achieve those rights in the foreseeable future. Susa said that the Croatian side has overlooked this fact, which has given rise to a series of new problems, which, in turn, is [word indistinct] of the situation in the district.

What will happen when discussion starts regarding newborns, persons whose marital status has changed, or the children born in such marriages? [as heard] asked Susa, and said: The way in which the Croatians intend

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to deal with this is evident in their most determined and [word indistinct] position, which is the amnesty law.

Mr. (?Graham Day), who also took part in the discussion, pointed out that some of the people present had interpreted the jurisdiction of the (?committees) wrongly and emphasized that Klein will have the final word on the matter.

[(?Day), in English with superimposed translation into Serbo-Croatian] Our report says that there is no need for pilot projects, that we can proceed with general registration, and that he will decide when the (?organization) will be done.

[Unidentified correspondent] The discussion of this item was then closed. In conclusion, Dr. Stanimirovic stated that the issue of the pensions and disability insurance fund of Beli Manastir will be submitted to Mr. Klein as the position of the government. [sentence as heard]

[Stanimirovic] The records of all the pensioners (?as listed by the Croatian fund) who achieved pension rights in Croatia and are now on the territory of the Serb District of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem, will be put together by the expert teams of the Beli Manastir, Vukovar, [word indistinct] funds, and submitted to the other side.

[Unidentified correspondent] Moreover, it was decided that the pension rights should not be made conditional upon any previous (?acts) or documents, that the payments should be made through the Beli Manastir and Vukovar funds' expert teams, and that the pensioners should also receive the money for all the years of war during which the Croatian pension and disability insurance funds did not make payments.

This decision will be submitted to the transitional administrator, who will be the one to decide, and, as Dr. Stanimirovic said, it is up to the government to raise an objection if they have any—with the secretary general.

The topic of the oil fields in Djeletovci was no less important and no less indicative of the difficult situation the province has been faced with since the oil fields were closed.

[Stanimirovic] It was said that the oil fields were being closed so that the Yugoslav oil pipeline could resume operation and that the oil fields would be open again after seven or 10 days.

[Unidentified correspondent] This did not happen. In the attempt to overcome the situation through (?talks), two completely different positions were reached. Dr. Stanimirovic said that the position of the Serb side is that the Krajina oil industry [Nik] from Mirkovci should remain at the provincial level, both as far as the sale of the oil and extraction and production are concerned. On the other hand, General Klein believes that Ina [Croatian Oil Industry] should have complete authority over the Djeletovci oil wells.

[Stanimirovic] We do not dispute Mr. Klein and his team's control over the oil wells, and we do not dispute the possible destination of the oil, but we want our management to stay, we want to have insight into the production, and we want the revenue that this oil generates, since the oil is exclusively ours, it is on our land.

[Unidentified correspondent] Borislav (Jevtic), district secretary for industry and energy, said that a demand should be made of Klein for the Krajina oil industry to retain its present status, since this organization is extremely important for this province.

[(Jevtic)] Our explanation is that the revenue yielded by the sale of the oil was used to practically support nonproductive activities. The budget covered the pensions, the needs of the education system, the health system, and the social welfare, and it is also closely related to the activity of the police. If the budget is empty, we cannot function.

[Unidentified correspondent] Simo Sijan, district secretary for agriculture, also spoke about the alarming situation that arose due to the shortage of oil.

[Sijan] I must say that we managed to successfully complete the spring sowing under extremely complex conditions, that this spring production was [word indistinct] on over 70,000 hectares, that postsowing activity is under way, which the success of the production and the crops depend on to a great extent, and also that the preparations for the harvest, which is to start within 20 days or so, are under way.

[Unidentified correspondent] The decision that was adopted on this issue is aimed towards finding a satisfactory solution as soon as possible in the scheduled talks with Klein.

[Stanimirovic] The second decision is that we urgently need to be able to buy and import fuel—from Hungary, Romania, or Yugoslavia, it does not matter from where—we cannot wait another day [passage indistinct] as well as for the upcoming agricultural work that is to take place within the following 10 days, and that concerns the early harvest work.

[Unidentified correspondent] The recent initiative for a special status for the district that the Vukovar assembly adopted and forwarded to the other assemblies has given rise to many comments in the district, as well as within the UNTAES and the circles of the Republic of Croatia.

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Much attention, therefore, was paid to the discussion stirred up by the objections made to the district government.

[Stanimirovic] We cannot prevent the assemblies from making demands—be they realistic or unrealistic. We have to collect all the demands that the municipal assemblies make, consider them together, determine what our positions are regarding these demands, and reach an agreement with Mr. Klein regarding the future (?procedures)—what the Serb people can achieve here, what the possibilities are, and what we can expect.

We are in no way bypassing Mr. Klein, making platforms, or passing resolutions on our own. These are initiatives of the municipal assemblies, which they are entitled to raise—it is in the human heart to ask—but the possibilities on the ground are very complicated and probably different. Things should therefore not be prejudiced, and there is no need to raise a lot of dust—this goes both for UNTAES and the Croatian side—as we are going to articulate the positions; our executive council—or government, if you will—will sit down together, and we will consider our possibilities and see what we can demand and what the minimum we are going to demand is, the minimum below which the Serb people here will not be able to go.

I would like to make it clear to Mr. (?Day) that this is not a demand made by our government and that these are not one-sided moves made by this government, but an initiative [words indistinct] municipal assembly we will not stand in the way of—instead, we will realistically consider the possibilities here and, together with you from UNTAES, we will (?see) what demands we will make considering [word indistinct].

[Unidentified correspondent] We took the opportunity to ask Mr. (?Graham Day) for a short interview. Mr. (?Day) would give only a short statement regarding the session of the provincial government which he attended as observer.

[(?Day), in English with superimposed translation into Serbo-Croatian] Today we were invited to the session of the executive council; we were invited several times to take part in the discussion and answer questions regarding the current situation in the province.

One of the issues that came up was the issue of pensioner registration, and I explained that the UNTAES position was that we felt we had learned a lot from the pilot project that was conducted in Darda. We are very pleased that more than 180 people registered for pensions—we now believe we are aware of the true feeling amongst the people as far as collecting their pensions is concerned, and we are aware of the practical and institutional problems we will face when we do the general pensioner registration.

The issue of the municipalities' proposal regarding autonomy for the district was also raised. UNTAES made no comment, but we paid particular attention to what was said, and we will report that to our senior management—more particularly, to Mr. Klein.

Another issue that was touched upon this morning was the issue of the amnesty. UNTAES has made its position quite clear and is working actively towards improving the law that has been passed.

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FYROM: Perry Arrives in Skopje, Meets Gligorov

LD1206185596 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1836 GMT 12 Jun 96

["Balpool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Skopje, June 12 (TANJUG)—U.S. Secretary of Defence William Perry and Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov stressed Wednesday the importance of the U.S. troops' presence in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] as well as of its recent joining the NATO Partnership for Peace programme.

Perry, visiting Macedonia for the third time since July 1994, addressed also Macedonian deputies, explaining the two countries' ways of cooperation in the sphere of security.

Commenting on Skopje talks, Perry said it was vital to coordinate civilian and military plans in planning the annual defence budget and to keep it under legal control.

Perry said joint manoeuvres within the Partnership for Peace programme would be held in Macedonia in autumn in which the action of regional rapid reaction units in case of earthquakes would be tested.

FYROM: Gligorov Warns of Danger of War in Bosnia

AU1206171896 Paris AFP in English 1701 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Skopje, June 12 (AFP)—Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov expressed concern Wednesday that war would break out again in Bosnia-Herzegovina if U.S. troops pulled out at the end of the year.

Gligorov raised that concern with U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry who was in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] for a short visit to dedicate a military training center here.

He said there was a "real danger" that the NATO-led mission in Bosnia would fail and renewed fighting would break out without the Implementation Force being able to keep peace.

"I have often expressed my concern that the tasks Bosnia faces right now are too great to be fulfilled in just a couple of short months," Gligorov said in an interview with reporters travelling with Perry.

Gligorov emphasized the importance of maintaining U.S. troops in the NATO-led peace force, noting that the peace process in Bosnia had only been a success because Washington came in with a large contingent of troops.

Perry, on the first stop of a five-day European tour, met with the Macedonian leader and delivered a speech to parliament that called for cooperation through NATO's Partnership for Peace program and military transparency as keys to future stability and peace in the Balkans.

Earlier, as he flew to Macedonia, Perry told reporters U.S. ground troops should take part in a new NATO force next year if it is needed to prevent war from breaking out again in Bosnia.

In an emotion-charged ceremony, Perry dedicated a training center at a Macedonian military academy in Skopje in memory of Joseph Kruzel, the defense department official who dreamed up the Partnership for Peace concept.

Kruzel was killed last year along with State Department official Robert Frasure in an accident on a mountain road in Bosnia while trying to negotiate peace.

His widow, Gail, and young son John listened as Kruzel was praised as a humanitarian and peacemaker.

Macedonia is the 27th member of the Partnership for Peace program, and Perry's third visit here was aimed at encouraging that process and at reaffirming the U.S. military relationship with Macedonia's 20,0000-strong army.

The Macedonian parliament recently extended the mandate of a UN peacekpeeing mission, which includes 556 U.S. troops and has been in operation since 1992 to prevent ethnic unrest in other former Yugoslav republics from spilling over into Macedonia.

Perry had lunch and met with U.S. peacekeepers at Camp Able Sentry before flying to Brussels for a meeting Thursday of NATO defense ministers.

FYROM: FRY Media Not Allowed To Cover Perry Visit

LD1206192196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1847 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Skopje, June 12 (TANJUG)—Reporters of the Yugoslav news agency TANJUG and the Belgrade daily VECERNJE NOVOSTI were prevented from covering the visit of U.S. Defence Secretary William Perry to Skopje.

The two Yugoslav reporters were not allowed to enter the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Parliament building, where Secretary Perry addressed the deputies and gave a news conference together with Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov.

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The reporters were prevented from carrying out their regular duties despite the fact that they had valid accreditations and special passes for Secretary Perry's visit to Skopje issued by the competent ministries and the U.S. Information Service.

The head of the Macedonian Parliament Information Service Djoko Popovski said as an explanation that the Defence Ministry had 'sent a new list with names of reporters allowed to attend the event'.

FYROM: Frckovski Signs NATO Cooperation Document

AU1206174096 Paris AFP in English 1735 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels, June 12 (AFP)—Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Maceonia—FYROM] has taken a first step towards full NATO membership, the foreign ministry said here Wednesday after approving an individual document on military cooperation with the alliance.

Foreign Minister Ljubomir Frckovski told reporters his country's aim was to become "a full-fledged member of NATO," and said there was "a social and political consensus" in Macedonia on this issue.

Frckovski's statement followed a meeting with the North-Atlantic Council at the level of ambassadors from the alliance's 16 member nations.

The approval of a partnership between Macedonia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization follows the former's entry into the Partnership for Peace programme in November 1995.

The programme was launched by NATO in January 1994 and extended essentially to countries of central and eastern Europe.

Based on military cooperation the Partnership for Peace programme includes joint planning, joint military exercises, exchange of officers and joint peacekeeping efforts.

Although the programme offers no security guarantees it states that NATO will consult with any partner that perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.

FYROM: Tetovo Rally Urges 'Commitment' to Albanians

AU1206160996 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In the main square in Tetovo, a large number of pupils, students, and parents have protested against the poisoning of the pupils of the Tetovo medical school. Various political groups have also protested against this, and among them the Party for Democratic Prosperity. The speakers and all those present at the rally expressed their indignation at this inhuman act, vented their rage over the irresponsible behavior of the authorities, and refused the cynical, insulting, and arrogant interpretations of those who held the victims responsible, condemning such behind-the-stage and premeditated experiments.

The speakers at the rally asked the Government of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] to show a greater commitment toward finding the culprits, as well as to bear responsibility for te indifference in treating the poisoned pupils and the cynicism of the doctors who, with insulting words and allegations, blamed the pupils for using analgesics.

The speakers said that the Macedonian state authorities and international factors should be aware of the feeling of insecurity that Albanians have to face in all the political, educational, economic, social, and health care dimensions of the system.

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Poland: Solidarity in Dispute With Government Over Gdansk

LD1206180096 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1400 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Solidarity National Commission [KK] has decided to enter into an official collective labor dispute with the government over the liquidation of the Gdansk Shipyard and the failure to implement a restructuring program at the yard. According to the union, the shipyard's liquidation will lead to mass redundancies among shipyard workers.

Leszek Walczak, a KK member, said that during negotiations with the government the union will demand that the interests of the dismissed yard employees be protected.

Poland: Gdansk Shipyard Workers Claim Backing of PSL's Pawlak

LD1206143696 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1300 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Jerzy Borowczak, chairman of the shipyard Solidarity organization, said at a rally that the shipyard has the support of Waldemar Pawlak, chairman of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL]. He will discuss the situation at the yard with Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz and Minister for Ownership Transformations Wieslaw Kaczmarek. A sit-in strike has been continuing at the shipyard since this morning.

The striking shipyard workers have received a declaration of support from Silesian miners and workers from other shipyards in the tricity [Gdansk, Gdynia, Sopot].

The protest action by the Gdansk Shipyard work force has also gained the support of the National Commission of the August-80 Free Trade Union. In a statement issued by August-80, the union described the announcement on the shipyard's bankruptcy as political revenge on the cradle of the workers' protest of 1980. In the union's opinion, economic reasons are of secondary importance in this case.

Maciej Jankowski, chairman of the Mazowsze Solidarity branch [central Poland], has said that there will be no all-out national strike in support of the Gdansk Shipyard workers. In his opinion, such an action would be too costly.

Poland: PM's Aide on Organized Crime Resigns in Protest

LD1206151596 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1400 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] After a month in office, Colonel Slawomir Petelicki has resigned as the prime minister's plenipotentiary for combating organized crime. He said he was prevented from carrying out any formal activity and recently even from having any contact with the prime minister.

[Begin Petelicki recording] I assembled a team of experts whom I had known from various circles. They agreed to work with me straight away. The embassies of countries that have experience in this field immediately declared specific assistance because they knew me as well. In fact, I was on the other side of the barricade some time ago, like, for example, with the Americans, but they had a good understanding of the issues involved, and I received assistance from them.

However, a double secretary—a secretary of state and a secretary of the Council of Ministers—Mr. Grzegorz Rydlewski, started torpedoing it from the beginning. Until now, I cannot understand why when, for example, I asked about my official status, he said I had to serve a three-month probation period as a pensioner and that we would discuss the status business later.

My office, ladies and gentlemen, is what you can see here. It is this briefcase. I worked from home all the time. I shall not send an invoice to the Office of the Council of Ministers, although I made many telephone calls, also abroad. But why should I tolerate humiliations? [end recording]

Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, who has accepted Slawomir Petelicki's resignation, did not want to comment on the accusations against Council of Ministers Secretary Grzegorz Rydlewski.

Poland: Prosecutorial Proceedings in Oleksy Case Closed

WS1206114696 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 12 Jun 96 p 1

[Article by Jaroslaw Kopec and Pawel Wronski: "The Prosecutor Will Not Be a Suspect; He Did the Right Thing To Disclose"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *No investigation will be launched into the disclosure of the name of the Russian agent doubled by the Office of State Protection [UOP] to Jozef Oleksy by Prosecutor Gorzkiewicz.*

Yesterday in Bydgoszcz, Colonel Henryk Biniek, prosecutor of the Pomeranian Military District, signed a ruling, stating that no investigation will be launched against Slawomir Gorzkiewicz, the prosecutor from the Warsaw Military District.

Prosecutor Gorzkiewicz headed the case of Jozef Oleksy's alleged cooperation with the Russian intelligence services and decided not to launch proceedings

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against him. He showed the former prime minister the text of the justification of the ruling that contained the name of the Russian agent turned by UOP.

"Do you remember the speech given by [former Interior] Minister Milczanowski at the Sejm, in which the prime minister was accused in the eyes of the entire nation and the world of the most serious crime—of years of espionage, of treason, of all the worst things?" asked Prosecutor Biniek. "For the politician and the prime minister, this was civic death. For the man, this was a tragedy."

Prosecutor Biniek thus concluded that Prosecutor Gorzkiewicz had "the right, the obligation even" to present Oleksy with the full text of the justification of the verdict.

The disclosure of the name of the agent could not have harmed state interests in any way because, according to the prosecutor's office, "as prime minister, Oleksy had access to far more important state secrets."

It is worth remembering that Justice Minister Leszek Kubicki and Interior Minister Zbigniew Siemiatkowski had both said that Gorzkiewicz did not have the right to disclose the name of the agent.

The ruling passed by the Bydgoszcz prosecutor's office yesterday practically closes all prosecutorial proceedings in the Oleksy case.

[Immediately below the above report, GAZETA WYBORCZA carries a 150-word untitled commentary by Piotr Pacewicz. The author states that Prosecutor Biniek was to "establish whether Colonel Gorzkiewicz had the right to disclose a top state secret." "Instead," the commentary says, "we received an essay that seems to have been written on the instructions of the administration." "For all those who are still seeking the truth in the Oleksy case," Pacewicz writes, "the statement made by Colonel Biniek was a bitter pill to swallow. Who can be trusted if state organs compromise themselves one by one, when politicians become judges and prosecutors become essayists?"]

Poland: Secret UOP Orders on Surveillance Stir Controversy

WS1306070096 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 11 Jun 96 pp 1-2

[Article by "K.Gr., P.W.R., Ma.S.": "Controversy Stirred by Colonel Kapkowski's Secret Orders; Legal or Not?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *Interior Minister Zbigniew Siemiatkowski said in a special statement yesterday that the orders issued by Colonel Kapkowski [head of the Office of State Protection—UOP] did not violate the statutory duties of the UOP.*

Solidarity: The UOP Chief Has Violated the Law

"We will most probably notify the prosecutor general that a crime has been committed. This type of monitoring oversteps the provisions of the law on UOP and violates the trade union law and the constitution. We consider this a crime," we were told yesterday by Stanislaw Alot, secretary of the Solidarity National Commission.

"The instructions speak of targeting organized groups in companies. And who is organized? The trade unions. What this boils down to is establishing an intelligence network in companies, surveilling the activities of trade unions. The connotations are clear to us," he stated.

OPZZ: Unnecessary Orders

"The UOP chief should not have made such a decision. There should also have been no leaks," Jozef Wiaderny, deputy chairman of the All-Poland Trade Union Agreement [OPZZ] told RZECZPOSPOLITA. OPZZ Chairwoman Ewa Spychalska said that the OPZZ presidium would deal with the issue today. OPZZ Spokesman Grzegorz Ilka was more stern. He claims that the orders have the same implications as the infamous 00/15 instruction on [the surveillance of] political parties. "In terms of operational techniques, the order allows for both the tapping of telephone conversations of trade union activists from so-called key companies and for the acquisition of so-called personal information sources among trade union activists," he said. [passage omitted]

Politicians

Jozef Oleksy, chairman of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, asked by reporters at a news conference what he thought of the orders issued by Kapkowski, said that UOP had an obligation to provide the government with information. When he was prime minister, he himself received UOP reports on the internal situation in the country in all areas. He never inquired how the information was collected because he assumed it was collected legally. Oleksy claims it would be improper if Kapkowski's orders provided a basis for surveilling trade unions. He says the whole case should have been examined internally, not in public.

"The affair is becoming a full-blown scandal. The fact that deputies are revealing top secret information is paranoid," said Oleksy.

"Are the state authorities supposed to learn that, for example, railway workers are to go on strike from television?" asks Janusz Zemke, a deputy of the Democratic Left Alliance. He sees nothing unusual in the fact that

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the secret services will inform the authorities about possible threats to state security in advance. He does say, however, that UOP cannot collect intelligence in companies by applying operational techniques. It can acquire information by maintaining friendly relations with company management. "I understand we are talking about information and not UOP preventive measures. Counteraction is inadmissible," adds Zemke.

"If the document is authentic, it means we are in a morass. We liquidated the Fifth Department of the Security Service in order to prevent the secret services from entering companies and taking anticipatory 'protective' action or installing their networks there," says Krzysztof Kozlowski, senator of the Freedom Union [UW] and interior minister in Tadeusz Mazowiecki's government. He has not observed UOP carrying out such operations since 1989. "We deliberately established the Analysis and Information Bureau at UOP so that information would be gathered from open sources." [passage omitted]

Deputy Lucyna Pietrzyk of the Polish Peasant Party, a member of the Sejm Secret Services Commission, said she had never before seen the document revealed by Deputy Napierala. She considers the contents disconcerting, even ominous.

"I only know what I read in the papers, but I assume that the law on UOP might have been violated. UOP has no right to surveil political parties, trade unions, or companies," says Lucyna Pietrzyk. She claims that Sejm rules might also have been violated because the UOP chief has an obligation to consult with the Sejm commission regarding some of his decisions.

Poland: Officer Views Military Information Services

WS1206114396 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 10 Jun 96 p 3

[Article by Major Marek Ciecierski: "Five Years of the WSI; Secret Services Have Many Names"]

[FBIS Translated Text] If one were to take some politicians' statements and some press titles seriously, we have already ceased to exist. Only there is no agreement as to the circumstances of our liquidation. According to some, we have been liquidated. The WPROST weekly maintains that we ourselves have crossed the line of self-destruction. Others mention paralysis and the loss of capability for action, which in our case means death, as well.

Although all these graveyard news items pertained to the State Protection Office in connection with the well-known affair [the Oleksy case], the ungrounded use of the term "Polish special services" could produce an impression that the Military Information Services [WSI] are also stricken by the disease attributed to their civilian counterparts. We have reason to believe that putting the matter in this way has confused our readers. We hasten to report that the rumors of our death were slightly exaggerated. On the contrary, we continue to exist and are approaching the sixth year of our existence with considerable baggage of achievements.

In September, the WSI will celebrate the fifth anniversary of its existence. This modest jubilee provides a perfect opportunity for shedding some light on the institution in this military daily and, above all, for explaining the essence of its activity because there have been many myths, misunderstandings, and obvious distortions amassed around the WSI.

A Little Bit of History

When in 1990 the military counterintelligence service (from the disbanded Military Police) was included—by a decision of the Defense Ministry authorities—in the General Staff Second Directorate, the chapter called "politicizing the military special services" was closed. Formerly powerful and independent, the Military Police faced radical changes. On the one hand, it had to pay a price for old political decisions, and, on the other, it objectively did not suit the "postroundtable" reality and its challenges. Before the fusion of the military counterintelligence and intelligence services, the former was subject to a process of being considerably slimmed down, which today is unjustly called by some a soft or "velvet" vetting. The cuts were radical and, consequently, painful. Only 30 percent of the former Military Police officers were transferred to serve in the Second Directorate. An additional 30 percent were temporarily placed on transitory lists [wykazy przejsciowe]. The number of local counterintelligence bodies was reduced by 27 percent; the number of duty positions of servicemen with a counterintelligence specialty was reduced by 60 percent, including a 67-percent reduction in the duty positions of operational reconnaissance officers. In the process of filling positions in the new structures, 83 officers who formerly assumed high posts in the Military Police were not taken into account.

This was not enough. At the moment of the creation of the WSI, in September 1991, there were 33 replacements in top positions of the blended intelligence and counterintelligence services—that is, 70 percent of the leading personnel were replaced. In 1992, due to a reorganization of local structures of the military counterintelligence service, the rate of replacements of the leading personnel in sections reached 70 percent, while in departments it reached 60 percent. In total, during 1990-92, 798 military counterintelligence and intelligence ser-

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vicemen were either discharged or transferred from the WSI.

So, if today someone hints at the possibility of a vetting in the military special services, this sounds like a grim joke told under a particular political demand. The State Protection Office staff, which was vetted in an exemplary manner by commissions that included all political forces, are still being divided into patriots and "ubeks" [derogatory term for security service workers deriving its origin from the acronym of the Urzad Bezpieczenstwa—Polish Interior Ministry in the Stalinist period]. Depending on the whim of some politician or another, one time they are included in the former group and another time in the latter. The criteria, as we can see, are very unstable and subsequent attempts at vetting will not change anything in this respect.

New Tasks

The new structure, the WSI, was charged with the tasks connected with the protection of the Polish Republic's defense interests or, to be more precise, with detecting and preventing threats to our defense capability and disclosures of state secrets in this sphere. We were also charged with the task of providing state bodies with information and analyses essential from the military point of view. Following the abolishment of its investigative bodies, the WSI has gotten rid of its police service features and assumed an exclusively operational character, which was met with a sigh of relief. As of today, there has not been any longing to reinstate the former powers, although discussions about this topic have resurfaced once again. One can only state that military special services in other democratic countries do not have such powers, either.

We had to fulfill our tasks in rather unfavorable conditions. First of all, being a special service officer at the end of the 1980's was not seen as a reason for pride in society. The rather ill-famed past [of the special services] and an aggressive press campaign launched by new publications following the abolishment of censorship did their job. Some right-wing publications tried to present the WSI as an omnipotent institution that continues to use the form of address "comrade" and that, in the event of favorable winds from the East, is able to seize power in the country through a coup.

It was necessary to start by creating a positive image, which was not abundant in the past, and by convincing everybody that the WSI must exist. Large fluctuations in the political arena and a real personnel merry-go-round in the government did not forward normal work, either. Despite these complex circumstances, the WSI, in the eyes of their superiors, performed their tasks conscientiously. They were praised by defense ministers from different political groups. The Sejm Commission for Special Services, which was set up last year, has not expressed any objections regarding their work, either.

The WSI has proved, first and foremost, that it is apolitical. It has not been involved in any political or election campaign and has not taken part in any disputes or scandals, which were abundant in the political life of the past five years, although temptations from politicians of different orientations were numerous.

The media tried to impute to all of the WSI chiefs (the current one is the fifth) such political sympathies and inclinations that they sometimes could not even dream of.

It is necessary to emphasize that, despite these kinds of ungrounded speculations and attempts at political labeling, today the WSI is not political but provides state services, and the credit for this must go to all of its chiefs, former and present, who were able to find an appropriate distance from ongoing political games and place the good and the future of the military special services higher than their personal political sympathies.

Quite Different Institutions

The current intelligence and counterintelligence services are quite different institutions from those that existed five or six years ago. A real change of generations has taken place in them. At present, members of the WSI leadership (which includes the chief, deputy chief, directorate and bureau chiefs, and their deputies) were no higher than in the post of section chief prior to 1989, which means a medium level of command in this institution's hierarchy. The average age of the leading personnel does not exceed 50 years; it should be noted that this kind of service does not record any breakneck careers like that of Nikodym Dyzma [hero of a popular novel]. A too quick promotion to higher positions, not to mention skipping some of them, would mean the loss of some important stage in education and might bring more losses that one could imagine.

The average age of WSI officers is about 40 years, while, for instance, that of intelligence officers oscillates around 39 years. This is a very low figure if you take into account the fact that the operational and analytical departments employ officers with former experience in line units, following appropriate training in the WSI. Most often, an officer who begins operational work on his own is 28-30 years old. It is worth emphasizing that the knowledge of foreign languages among the officers has considerably improved in the period following the creation of the WSI. At present, the rate of knowledge of foreign languages in the intelligence and analytical departments, as well as in the

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Bureau of Military Attaches—in places where foreign language is an everyday tool—is equal to 91 percent. Many officers are studying and improving four basic languages.

To avoid creating too sugary an image of the military intelligence and counterintelligence services, we will devote a few sentences to their problems, which are not lacking.

Weak Points of Not Only the WSI

The basic weak point, particularly palpable in the recent period, is a not always satisfactory level of security of classified information. The WSI, as a body legislatively responsible for detecting and preventing disclosures of state secrets in the defense sphere, has had much proof that classified information finds its way to the press too easily and is often used in the ongoing political struggle. Vital national interests may suffer from this. Unfortunately, in Poland the desire to attract readership too often dominates over common sense and responsibility.

Undoubtedly, it is necessary to modernize the current law on the protection of secrets. The first step in such an action should be to introduce a new law on secrets with a package of executive acts. Problems of the protection of the state defense potential should be given unquestionable priority.

A seesaw of concepts, often changes in the WSI's subordination, and replacements in the leadership have hampered the complex work intended to organize the WSI's activity and create the WSI's legislative basis. Recently, the pace of debate over a law on the WSI, which was discussed by the Sejm Commission for Special Services, has been quickened. This law would stabilize the WSI's position with regard to state bodies and draw a more precise dividing line between the authority of military and civilian special services; in addition, it could abolish a multitude of various normative acts. This delicate sphere of state activities should not include even minor legal gaps and doubts.

In September, the Military Information Services will mark the fifth anniversary of its existence. The article by Major Ciecierski inaugurates a series of publications aiming at bringing our readers closer to this institution, but not only at that.

Successes of the intelligence and counterintelligence services are possible only if these services are able to operate under circumstances of social approval and can take advantage of the citizens' broad assistance. For these circumstances to appear, taxpayers must have at least an elementary knowledge of the services for which they pay their money. They must also be aware that these services were created not against them, but for their security. We hope that the announced series [of articles] will fill this information gap with regard to the military special services and "demystify" them. (Editors)

Poland: Democratic Left Alliance To Vote Against Concordat

LD1206163096 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1005 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Leszek Miller, head of the Office of the Council of Ministers [URM], has announced that the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] will vote in the Sejm against the ratification of the Concordat with the Vatican. At a meeting with President Aleksander Kwasniewski yesterday, SLD deputies decided that the Concordat ratification should not be delayed any longer because there is no more hope that any of the sides will change their positions.

In an interview for Polish radio, Leszek Miller explained that the SLD is against the ratification because the Vatican does not want to agree either to renegotiate the agreement or to include an annex that might contain clarification of some of the Concordat regulations and that left-wing deputies have asked for.

[Begin Miller recording] The SLD will vote against the ratification because all of the various attempts to amend the most controversial parts of the Concordat have been unsuccessful.

[Unidentified correspondent] And how about including an annex to the agreement?

[Miller] There will be no annex. This idea was mooted, but the Holy See has expressed its unequivocal view that there can be no such annex.

[Correspondent] However, an annex was discussed yesterday, and after the meeting the spokesman for the SLD parliamentary floor group also mentioned it.

[Miller] Various possibilities that could lead to ratification were discussed. First, there was a proposal to renegotiate the agreement. Next, there was a proposal to include an annex that would be added as an integral part of the agreement. Finally, there was talk about an additional protocol that could be signed and treated as a bilateral document. None of these proposals have been accepted by the Vatican. [end recording]

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Slovenia: 'Repression' Following Kaminsky Affair Alleged

AU1006131796 Ljubljana MAG in Slovene 5 Jun 96 p 1

[Commentary by Danilo Slivnik: "Detectors for the Dead"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Since using lie detector tests and mercilessly interrogating suspects has become all the rage in Slovenia lately, "polygraphs" could soon be standard office furniture at major companies, along with the staples, ficus trees, and typewriters. The fact that 20 Mercator employees were given lie detector tests as a result of the notorious Kaminsky dossier is not merely scandalous but constitutes a flagrant human rights violation, regardless of the claims that all the potential suspects allegedly agreed to the test "voluntarily" and that Director Zivko Pregl was the first to take it.

It is high time that we ask ourselves what is happening in Slovenia. Does nobody really care any more, and are the (illusory) potentates free to do whatever they please? Have all the formerly ardent human rights activists acquiesced to the view that Stalinist methods are okay so long as they are applied in a multiparty society? For instance, where is Spomenka Hribar now to vent her wrath about the unacceptable and totalitarian methods used by those who commissioned the investigation of the potentially suspicious Mercator employees? Do they suddenly find these methods acceptable because the investigators are investigating the suspected criminal acts which landed State President Milan Kucan in trouble two months ago?

For me, "the polygraph incident" in Pregl's company is a lot worse, for instance, than the Jansa "populist mishap" on the Square of the Republic last year. The latter did not hide any repressive mechanisms, while the incident in Mercator boiled down to direct management pressure on the employees and was a peculiar reflection of the Bolshevik logic of the former communists, who evidently still believe they can resort to any means to protect their power. In this vein, somebody could come up with the idea of closing the entire town and installing lie detectors and bugs on every street corner (it would certainly be the simplest solution, but then how would the politicians move around town?).

There are two more unusual things about the Mercator investigation: first, the criminal investigators are still searching for "the independent source," who is believed to have brought some of the information connected to the Kaminsky affair to light; and second, they believe that it could have been done by an employee of a commercial enterprise. This resembles the Maribor arms affair, when the Komar notes were leaked to the public. Only two people had the notes: Maribor District Prosecutor Dusan Pozar and Slovene Information-Security Agency [SOVA] Chief Silvan Jaklin. The criminal investigators came to ask me where I obtained the notes instead of asking their chiefs whom they had given them to. Something similar is happening in the Kaminsky affair. The controversial information could only have originated from SOVA, as this organization had been monitoring the activity of this U.S. arms dealer before. Evidently, those who commissioned the investigation would now like to convince themselves that there is "a plot" behind it all and that somebody fabricated the affair. A well-known story is being repeated. The criminal investigators are hunting for those who pointed out the impermissible behavior of top state officials instead of worrying (themselves or somebody else) about what the president of the state is doing.

Of course, all investigations of this type have a purpose—to intimidate as many people as possible (especially the bureaucrats) and render the powerful figures untouchable, although it is they who often pass certain information to the public in order to achieve some political effect. Milan Kucan is particularly renowned for this type of "communication," but when he does it he does not demand that the Crime Department "immediately find the perpetrators." That is why now that lie detectors have come in vogue, numerous officials and directors are thinking of ways to make their cabinets as "soundproof" as possible. This, for example, also applies to Herman Rigelnik, director of Avtocommerce in Ljubljana.

When he saw last week that some of his political plans had reached the public (particularly the news about the replacement of Dr. Janez Drnovsek) he was reportedly so infuriated that he did not know what to do with himself and was casting suspicious glances at everyone around him (at least that is what our sources in his administration said). Above all, for a long time he could not decide what to deny. He would love to deny it all, but of course he could not. For a while he wanted to deny the information about the losses experienced by Gorenje concern on the date of his departure in 1991 (60 million German marks). His advisers, however, told him it would be utterly pointless as there are such things as balance sheets.

But that has not stopped him. He is still negotiating his return to politics with some people, and he is already indirectly canvassing ministers. In Liberal Democracy [LDS] he most frequently contacts Igor Bavcar, with whom he is allegedly negotiating for a "transfer" of various documents. [LDS Secretary General] Grega

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Golobic cannot decide which way to turn or with whom to side and is somewhere between Drnovsek and Rigelnik. That is why the next few months could be quite hot, especially if the representatives of civilian society fail to do anything to stem the tide of the newly formulated repression. That is, it would be very wrong indeed if politicians managed to popularize the belief that a secret among three people in Slovenia can only remain a secret if two of them are dead....

Slovenia: Economy Falters on Political Errors

LD1106141796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1344 GMT 11 Jun 96

[Report by Igor Saranovic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ljubljana, June 11 (TANJUG)—The Slovenian economy, [word indistinct] with a wave of strikes and sharp criticism from the opposition has stopped in the past months, hiding its many defeats.

Admitting officially that it had slipped on the 'political banana' of its own leadership, the once most successful economy of the former Yugoslavia is becoming more and more local while many of its branches, which were until recently present on international markets are faced with the insurmountable barrier of western competitors.

Analysts hold the government mainly responsible for the lost national economic pride—accusing it of conducting a totally wrong economic policy.

Even the deputies of the lower house of parliament, until recently tolerant supporters of the government of Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek, asked last week for the cabinet to adopt urgent measures to stop the downfall of the national economy.

There are also the first indicators that Germany, Slovenia's biggest ally, is turning its back to Slovenian economy.

According to official statistical data industrial output has been dropping by five percent a month since the beginning of the year and Slovenia is heading towards its biggest recession in five decades.

Almost every other firm has difficulties with solvency and almost every fourth borrows funds for wages, or is deeply indebted.

Last year Slovenia registered its largest trade deficit of 1.17 billion dollars, which is twice the one in 1994.

Economists said that Slovenian exports outside the countries on the territory of the former Yugoslavia had dropped by half in the past three years.

It is not surprising therefore that there is a growing number of those, especially from economic circles, who consider that one of the main reasons for the self-induced downfall of the so-called Slovenian miracle is its blind subordination to the country's politics in its euphoric secession.

Almost ninety percent of Slovenia's directors from different branches of the economy recently said they wanted to renew cooperation with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Slovenia: Joint Military Maneuvers With Austria Approved

AU0806201696 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1700 GMT 8 Jun 96

[Report by Edvard Puksic on meeting of Slovene Defense Minister Jelko Kacin and Austrian Defense Minister Werner Fasslabend in Sladki Vrh on 8 June—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Puksic] This was a regular working meeting of both delegations. Its timing lends it special weight, as only two days remain until the signing of Slovenia's EU associate membership.

[Kacin] We both concluded that our future steps should be mutually coordinated in due time. That is why we met prior to the defense ministers' summit in Brussels next week. We will also continue the dialogue with the Hungarian defense minister early next week. Among other things, we agreed to meet again for official talks in Slovenia very soon. We also proposed organizing joint military maneuvers very soon, and our proposal was received with approval.

[Puksic] The Austrian defense minister emphasized that the Defense Ministry of our neighboring country received the news of Slovenia's success in acquiring the associate membership through talks with great satisfaction.

The ministers assessed the technical cooperation of the armies to be excellent. The Slovene officers are training successfully in the Austrian Army. There was also talk of the integration of the Slovene soldiers into the units for international intervention.

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Federal

FRY: Prime Minister Kontic Reshuffles Government

LD1206173796 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1540 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 12 Jun (TANJUG)—At a session today, Prime Minister Dr. Radoje Kontic briefed the government about the latest changes in the federal government, the Federal Information Secretariat has announced.

Tomica Raicevic has been appointed federal minister of finance; Dr. Vladimir Krivokapic as minister of justice; Dr. Rade Filipovic as minister of economy; Dr. Tihomir Vrebalov as minister of agriculture; and Radonja Minic as minister without portfolio.

In line with his decision to separate the functions of deputy prime ministers and federal ministers, federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic has entrusted the federal deputy prime ministers with specific tasks.

Deputy Prime Minister Jovan Zebic will coordinate and direct the work of the federal ministries and other federal bodies and organizations in the sphere of finance and banking, financial markets, and customs, and will oversee the enforcement of the federal government's measures in these spheres. He will represent the federal government on the Council of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, coordinate the federal government's work with international financial organizations and carry out other tasks set by the federal prime minister.

Deputy Federal Prime Minister Uros Klikovac coordinates and directs the work of the federal ministries and other federal authorities and organizations in the field of the legal and political system and defense and security; he takes care of the implementation of federal government measures in these fields; he coordinates the activities of the federal government and federal authorities and organizations in their relations with public institutions set up by the federation; and he carries out other tasks entrusted to him by the federal prime minister.

Deputy Federal Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic coordinates and directs the work of the federal ministries and other federal authorities and organizations in the area of the economic system, economic policy, and the unified market; he takes care of the implementation of federal government measures in these fields; he coordinates the activities of the federal government and federal authorities and organizations in their relations with public institutions set up by the federation; and he carries out other tasks entrusted to him by the federal prime minister.

After these changes, the federal government comprises: Prime Minister Radoje Kontic; three deputy prime ministers—Jovan Zebic, Uros Klikovac, and Nikola Sainovic; and 15 federal ministers, as follows:

Milan Milutinovic—minister of foreign affairs

Pavle Bulatovic—minister of defense

Vukasin Jokanovic—minister of internal affairs

Tomica Raicevic—finance minister

Prof. Vladimir Krivokapic—minister of justice

Dr. Rade Filipovic—minister of economic affairs

Prof. Tihomir Vrebalov—minister of agriculture

Dr. Zoran Vujovic—minister of transport and communications

Djordje Siradovic—minister of trade

Miroslav Ivanisevic—minister of labor, health, and social welfare

Prof. Janko Radulovic—minister of development, science, and the environment

Dr. Zoran Bingulac—minister

Vuk Ognjanovic—minister

Margit Savovic—minister

Radonja Minic—minister

The federal government will be represented in the work of the Council of the National Bank of Yugoslavia by Deputy Prime Minister Jovan Zebic and Federal Finance Minister Tomica Raicevic.

Deputy Prime Minister Uros Klikovac has been put in charge of permanent cooperation and coordination of work with the Chamber of Republics of the Federal Assembly, Deputy Prime Minister Jovan Zebic of cooperation with the Chamber of Citizens, and Deputy Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic of cooperation with the Yugoslav Chamber of Economy.

Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic will inform the Federal Assembly about this decision.

At today's session, the federal government also said that its priority continues to be legislative activities, economic measures which should give an impetus to the revitalization of economy, and speedier development and increase in the living standard. In the sphere of foreign affairs, Yugoslavia's reintegration in the international community will be promoted.

The federal government also passed decisions on the appointment of chairmen and members of federal government commissions. Margit Savovic has been appointed chairwoman of the commission for foreign educational and cultural cooperation; Zoran Bingulac has

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been appointed chairman of the commission for relations with religious communities; Radonja Minic has been appointed chairman of the commission for administrative issues; and Vuk Ognjenovic has been appointed chairman of the commission for housing issues, the statement says.

FRY: Minister, OSCE Officials Discuss Refugees, Elections

LD1206164296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1330 GMT 12 Jun 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 1 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Minister Tomica Raicevic conferred in Belgrade on Wednesday with officials of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on the role of refugees in the territory of Yugoslavia in the upcoming elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Raicevic told OSCE chairman's adviser Hans Peter Kleiner and vice-president of the interim OSCE election commission for Bosnia-Herzegovina Sir Kenneth Scott that Yugoslavia was ready fully to cooperate in the preparation of elections in agreement with international standards and norms, and for the due implementation of the article of the Dayton peace accords.

Yugoslavia will do everything within its competence for refugees to realize their voting rights in the most democratic way possible and thus contribute to a democratic choice of organs of authority in Bosnia-Herzegovina, said a statement released by the Federal Secretariat of Information.

FRY: ICRC Appeals for Assistance in Seeking Missing Persons

LD1206204896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1830 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 12 (TANJUG)—The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has started a campaign of collecting information about persons registered as missing in conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, ICRC Official Francois bellon said here on Wednesday.

Bellon, the head of the ICRC delegation for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, said that the organization had so far collected about 15,000 requests from the families of missing persons.

Of that number, about 12,000 are from Bosnia-Herzegovina, including 6,000 from the eastern Bosnian town of Srebrenica.

A total of 3,211 persons were missing in conflicts in Croatia in 1991, while more than 500 people were missing during Croatian military offensives on the Republic of Serb Krajina in May and August 1995, Bellon said.

The ICRC has prepared a publication with 11,000 names of missing persons, which will be distributed to all ICRC offices in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Yugoslavia, as well as in countries which accepted refugees, Bellon said.

He appealed to the families of missing persons who have not yet reported it to do so as soon as possible.

The ICRC has so far inquired after more than 8,000 persons missing in Bosnia, receiving information for no more than 200 cases.

The organization has also closed only 600 cases of missing persons in the territory of Croatia in 1991, Bellon said.

About 1,000 prisoners have been released in Bosnia since last January and the three sides still keep only 25 prisoners suspected of war crimes, while ICRC officials visit about 200 persons in Croatian prisons, Bellon said.

He said that information about the fate of the missing persons was very important for reaching a comprehensive and lasting peace.

Bellon said that the ICRC believed all sides had at least some information about missing persons and that there were also individuals who knew a lot. He said that, from the point of view of his organization, it was unacceptible that the question of missing persons still be politicized six months after peace was signed.

FRY: Lilic, Mugabe Note 'High Degree of Consensus'

AU1206201096 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 12 Jun 96

[Statement by FRY President Zoran Lilic following talks with Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe in Belgrade on 12 June—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Lilic] Allow me, first of all, to express my great satisfaction that we have the privilege to host such a, as regards Yugoslavia, definitely important guest in Belgrade today and in the next few days. Here, today, is everything that President Mugabe personally and the Republic of Zimbabwe did by extending support to FRY precisely at the moment when this was more than a courageous and necessary thing to do, especially for us in the FRY.

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Assessing today's visit and the talks, I can say that the talks were very good, that they, above all, radiated a very high degree of consensus on numerous issues, and, in the greatest part, also an identical understanding and perception of the greatest portion of international issues. What is particularly important is that we share very similar or identical views regarding the United Nations and its transformation, regarding the Nonaligned Movement, and regarding the strengthening of our economic and bilateral cooperation. What I can state with undisguised satisfaction here today is that the visit is not merely an expression and a confirmation of our friendship, but is also opening doors wide open to a considerable strengthening of our economic cooperation. I am deeply convinced that the economic cooperation is definitely an important, if not the most important, precondition for any other cooperation. I believe that the FRY and the Republic of Zimbabwe are making great strides forward in their mutual friendship, and I am convinced that this will be in the interests of the Republic of Zimbabwe and the FRY alike.

I would like to thank once again President Mugabe personally for supporting us when we needed it the most. As he himself said, one knows one's friends when one needs help the most.

I believe that, over the next few days, we will have the opportunity to establish, bearing in mind everything that will happen in the forthcoming talks and the visits to some of our companies, that there is a possibility of the FRY and Zimbabwe entering into some joint investments, however, more about this later. We will see what time will bring. In any case, it is important that we have reached an extremely high degree of consensus on all issues that we discussed today. Thank you!

[Announcer] At the beginning of his address to the correspondents, Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe voiced his satisfaction that he was invited to visit our country. Mugabe said that Zimbabwe's support for Yugoslavia was actually an expression of the gratitude and friendly support that Yugoslavia extended to Zimbabwe while it was still suffering under colonialism. You did this bravely and confidently. When we saw that you had problems and you were in a confrontation with those who craved the disintegration of your country, we did everything to help politically and diplomatically because friends know each other in times of trouble, Mugabe said.

Now we should cooperate more in the economy. That is why we are calling on your businessmen to come and invest in our country and boost the economic cooperation to the benefit of our peoples. President Mugabe also said that Zimbabwe supports Yugoslavia's complete return to the international community, to all institutions and organizations, especially the United Nations and the Nonaligned Movement.

FRY: Article Views New Army Deputy Chief of Staff

AU1206144996 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 12 Jun 96 p 4

[Article by V. Matevski: "Rise of Loyal General"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yugoslav President Zoran Lilic's decree on promotions and retirements in the Yugoslav Army is the result of last week's session of the Supreme Defense Council, which—as the public was informed—debated "accommodation issues" in the armed forces.

The greatest surprise most certainly is the appointment of Lieutenant General Dragoljub Ojdanic, commander of the 1st Army, to the hitherto nonexistent post of deputy chief of staff of the Yugoslav Army. Until President Lilic's decree, Chief of Staff Gen. Momcilo Perisic only had assistants for logistics, morale, information, and the intelligence-security services, but now Gen. Ojdanic is one step closer to the post of top officer in the Yugoslav Army.

The 1st Army commander is an officer who has the Serbian president's utmost confidence, whom he has seen off and welcomed back at Surcin airport from all the more important "peace missions," particularly Dayton. Analysts of local military affairs also did not fail to notice Gen. Ojdanic's presence at the last congress of the Socialist Party of Serbia. War caught this officer in his post in the Pristina Corps, and later he became prominent as chief of staff and then commander of the Uzice Corps.

Zoran Lilic's decree promoted 11 generals. Most of them had combat experience in the war, and it cannot be said that their promotions represent the forcing of a particular faction in the army.

Nine generals have been retired. The most prominent of them is Lt. Gen. Slavko Krivosija, former chief of the department for morale and information. He came to that post last year from the post of chief of the military cabinet of the Yugoslav president. He replaced Colonel Ljubodrag Stojadinovic, who fell from grace with the political leadership following a public debate.

[Box, p 4]

Retired Over Oil

Controversial Gen. Bora Ivanovic has also been retired. The General Staff was completely split over his previ-

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ous promotion. During the war, Ivanovic came to prominence with his military knowledge, but in peacetime—according to some of his colleagues and the press—he got into trouble by doing shady deals with oil.

Serbia

Serbia: President Milosevic Receives Carl Bildt

LD1206222096 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2103 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 12 Jun (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic today received Carl Bildt, high representative of the international community for Bosnia operation.

During the talks views were exchanged on the current point in the realization of the Dayton Agreement, with special emphasis on the implementation of the civilian and political aspects of the peace plan.

Particular attention was devoted to preparations for the upcoming elections and ways of ensuring the necessary conditions for the normalization of life and the reconstruction of the economy.

In this connection, the two stressed the particular importance of synchronizing the steps and activities of international factors to ensure consistent adherence to the obligations which arise from the peace agreement.

Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic also participated in the talks.

Serbia: 'No Serious Misunderstandings' Between Belgrade, Pale

AU1306092496 Belgrade BETA in English 6-13 Jun 96

[BETA headline: "Serbian President Supports Pale—Milosevic Again Unyielding"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text]

Bosnian Serbs Are Increasingly Content With the Position of Belgrade

In the beginning of this week Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic, once again expressed his open support to the Bosnian Serb leadership in Pale. In his interview with the German SPIEGEL magazine, carried on Monday, June 10, by the Yugoslav media, Milosevic directly stated that "[he does not see] anyone in Pale who is against the implementation of the Dayton Accord."

Answering the question whether such view included "the chauvinist Biljana Plavsic" (such was SPIEGEL's description of the Republic of Srpska's Deputy President), Milosevic responded that she had conveyed to him her "absolute readiness" to support the Dayton Accord.

Milosevic's statement openly confirmed that the Serbian President does not intend to renounce the firm positions he held before the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord. Milosevic strongly criticized the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague, describing it as a "political, instead of a legal institution."

Milosevic failed to directly mention the extradition of RS President, Radovan Karadzic, and military commander, General Ratko Mladic; he only said that Mladic "could not be" arrested when in the end of May he came to Belgrade to attend the funeral of RS Army General, Djordje Djukic, also indicted of war crimes. Milosevic said that in Serbia, a funeral is a "holy occasion" and that every person is free to attend it.

Milosevic's views came at the moment when the international community does not hold as its priority the extradition of war criminals, at least not before the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina end. Also, Milosevic's statements came at the time when it is quite obvious that the national parties will win the elections in Bosnia and that the division of the country would in this way be sealed.

Support to Karadzic

Karadzic and his closest collaborators in Pale could be completely content with Milosevic's interview with the German journalists. The Serbian President's direct statements, repeated extensively by all the Yugoslav and the RS media confirmed that what they have been claiming for a long time—that there are no serious misunderstandings between Belgrade and Pale.

By listening to Milosevic's words and by reading his views in the papers, the average voter in the Republic of Srpska can but conclude that the Serbian President is firmly and unerringly guiding the Serb nation to a safe and peaceful haven. Karadzic, Plavsic, and other members of the RS top leadership are consequently seen as undisputed freedom fighters deserving praise and, of course, votes.

Milosevic's position regarding the Hague Tribunal will certainly be welcomed in the RS. With it, he has dispersed all suspicions that for the sake of good relations with the international community, he was ready to deliver Karadzic and General Mladic to The Hague.

Obviously, the Serbian President feels stronger now, after managing to at least in appearance bring order to Pale by enforcing the silent stepping down of Radovan Karadzic. Milosevic wants to present Karadzic's resignation as his great political point. In this, he is supported

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by Moscow, which holds that Karadzic's demise is sufficient and that his arrest could ensue in chaos and new conflicts.

However, there is no firm evidence that Karadzic has indeed withdrawn from politics. He is certainly weakened, while Milosevic is enabled to have decisive influence on the leaders of the Serb nationalists in Bosnia and Herzegovina. After making a skillful deal with Pale and outwitting the international community, the Serbian President can once again claim himself a winner.

Well-informed sources close to the Bosnian Serb authorities claim that during Milosevic's meetings with the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs, held on the eve of the meeting of the signatories of the Dayton Accord in Geneva (on June 2), an agreement on other vital questions for the future of the RS has also been reached.

Thus, according to these sources, it was concluded "unanimously" not to let the city of Brcko, controlled at the present by the Serbs, to be transferred to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a result of the international arbitrage over it. Through Brcko the connection between the eastern and the western parts of the Serb entity in Bosnia leads, and the loss of control over it would certainly mark the end of the idea of an independent Republic of Srpska. Milosevic is not in favor of such an outcome and will strongly support Pale in its intention to retain control over the city.

Pale Is Content but...

After smoothing its relations with Belgrade, the ruling Serb Democratic Party (SDS) of Radovan Karadzic is counting on a landslide victory in the coming elections. There are reasons for slight uneasiness though, owed to few lines in Milosevic's interview. "During the elections radical changes will take place and positive results will emerge... New people from all three peoples will come to power, who are in favor of tolerance and cooperation, of trade and communication," Milosevic said.

The leadership in Pale is probably closely analyzing this part of the interview in an attempt to decipher what the Serbian President meant by "radical changes" and the emergence of the "new people." In the political practice characteristic of the former Yugoslavia, even Biljana Plavsic, who had replaced Karadzic, can figure as a "new man." If Milosevic had that kind of change in mind, than Pale has nothing to worry about.

Sources well-informed on relations between Serbia and RS, however, hold that Belgrade has no firm and clear concept regarding the elections in Bosnia and is adapting itself to events instead of creating them. According to them, Milosevic will not try to impose any particular person or party as a winner, but will only closely observe the situation in the political scene and will uphold a party or a political figure he finds profitable.

The true objective of such an approach should be the creation of the RS Parliament in which a new balance of power will be established owing to which Belgrade will be able to have significant influence, depending on the need. With the present monolith RS Parliament, in which the SDS has the absolute majority, he had a long lasting and painful experience which he certainly does not wish to continue having. The present parliament enabled Karadzic to refuse previous peace agreements for Bosnia.

The Socialists and the SDS Will Decide

At the present, the only parties having any serious chances of winning a large number of seats in the future RS Parliament are the RS Socialist Party (SPRS), which is directly influenced by Belgrade, and the ruling SDS. After holding their first congress in Banja Luka at the beginning of this month, the socialists have ventured onto a strong preeelection campaign. The media controlled by Pale are still keeping the socialists at bay, but the Belgrade media, reaching the Bosnian Serbs, are carrying their positions on a daily basis, enumerating all the "tricks" played on them by the SDS.

The support of the Belgrade media will probably prove insufficient for an election victory, but may well increase their influence in the next three months, making them serious competition for the SDS.

Such "political harmony" in Bosnia cannot be disrupted now by independent liberal political factions which are beyond the control of Pale or Belgrade. They seem to have been removed from the political scene for a longer period along with the former Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic. The remnants of the once strong "Banja Luka Block" are attempting to create coalitions in order to obtain the 10,000 signatures necessary for their participation in the campaign.

On Sunday, June 9, a Democratic Patriotic Block was formed in Bijeljina of the Democratic Center Party of Trebinje, Democratic Party of Bijeljina, the Popular Radical Party Nikola Pasic and the Fatherland Party of Banja Luka. The newly created block may turn capable of obtaining the necessary amount of signatures, but can hardly hope to win a significant number of seats in the Parliament. The previously announced joining of the Banja Luka major, Predrag Radic, to this block is not mentioned any longer and will probably depend on the SDS decision to retain him on his position or to replace him.

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The Liberal Party (LP) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP); both of Banja Luka, for the time being are outside coalitions, while the social democrats show certain closeness with the socialists. Alone, these parties cannot hope of meeting the election census requirements.

Serbia: Seselj Says Milosevic 'Plans To Cede Kosovo'

AU1206172296 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1449 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 12 Jun (BETA)—Serbian Radical Party President Vojislav Seselj stated today that the speech by Academician Aleksandar Despic on the manner of resolution of the Kosovo issue "was paving the way for the surrender of Kosovo or a portion of it to the Shiptars [derogatory term for the Albanians]."

"Academician Despic is an insignificant person. He is a pawn of the Socialist Party of Serbia and merely reflects everything that is going on at the top," Seselj stated at the news conference.

According to Seselj, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic "plans to cede Kosovo to the Shiptars, but he does not know yet how to carry it through to present it as his victory."

Serbia: SANU Remarks on Kosovo Seen Preparing Public for Change

AU1306093096 Belgrade BETA in English 6-13 Jun 96

[BETA headline: "The Southern Serbian Province Again on the Agenda—Serbia Without Kosovo?"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text]

The Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences Allows for Kosovo's Secession

The question of the southern Serbian province of Kosovo, in which ethnic Albanians comprise over 95 percent of the population, again made headlines last week when the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU) surprised the public by allowing for an agreement between Belgrade and the local Albanians which would imply the possible secession of the province from Serbia, that is, from the FR Yugoslavia.

During the SANU annual meeting on June 6, its newly elected president, Aleksandar Despic repeated the SANU position of Kosovo being "the most significant strategic problem" for the future of the Serb people, but allowed that for the resolution of this problem two ways exist: One, which insists on Kosovo being an integral part of Serbia, and the other, which accepts the requests of the ethnic Albanians to create an independent state. Despic's statement was completely unexpected, as the SANU is considered a symbol of radical nationalism and an institution which, long before the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, had aggressively promoted Serb national interests.

In addressing the academics, Despic said that "both ways have their advantages and their flaws" but that for making a choice "not much time is left," adding that owing to a high Albanian birthrate, the demographic structure of Serbia is "rapidly changing."

Despite pressures of the West saying that the province must remain an integral part of Serbia, political parties of Kosovo Albanians insist on the independence of Kosovo. The authorities in Serbia view Kosovo as an integral part of the country, asking from the Albanian population to recognize Serbia as their homeland. In the early 1990's, after Belgrade had canceled Kosovo's wide autonomy, the Kosovo Albanians refused to take part in the Serbian parliamentary elections, and organized elections of their own within Kosovo. Later on they established their parallel political bodies on all levels which have been operating to this day. Ibrahim Rugova was chosen as their leader.

Today, the Serb population in Kosovo presents a negligible minority, while Albanians are decisively in favor of the independent state of their own. So far, the Serbian authorities failed to show any willingness to resolve the problem through political means, offering instead only police repression. On their part, the Albanians also failed to show any greater readiness to cooperate, refusing to take part in public life and in the elections, in which, joined by the Serbian opposition, they could easily win a majority. The inability to resolve the problem through political means may well end now in a pragmatic, though a drastic denouement. Therefore, Despic's statement should be seen as the first step in the preparation of the public in Serbia for unavoidable changes in the status of Kosovo.

Despic also suggested that it is better to negotiate with the Albanians, even if it ends in secession, offering as his supporting thesis a notion of an ethnically pure state. "In a few decades," he said, "Serbia may well become a bilingual country."

Reactions

Among the opposition parties in Serbia there is a widespread conviction that Despic's statement does not reflect his personal view only.

"Academics with radical views of the Kosovo problem have never had the courage to step forward and express

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their ideas openly (on negotiations with the secessionists). Despic's speech shows that the courage is emerging, probably nudged from a higher place. Such SANU position raises my hopes," said Desimir Tosic, an independent MP in the Federal Parliament, previously a high official of the Democratic Party (DS).

Tosic suggested that the problem of Kosovo should be resolved in two stages. During the first, Kosovo would be given back the autonomy it used to enjoy in the former Yugoslavia according to the 1974 Constitution. Then, Kosovo was a Serbian province, but had representatives of its own in the former Yugoslav federation who had same prerogatives as the representatives of the Yugoslav republics. In the second stage, "a border between Kosovo and Serbia should be drawn, with which the larger part of the province should be given to the Albanians," Tosic holds.

Despic's statement confused the Serbs in Kosovo, who immediately started insisting that Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic, pay them a visit and inform them on their political future and their future in general. In the end of 1980's, by promising protection to the Serbs in Kosovo, Milosevic started his rise to power.

Leader of the recently established "Serbian Resistance Movement," the organization of the Kosovo Serbs opposed to Milosevic's new political course, Momcilo Trajkovic, said that Despic acted as "Milosevic's mouthpiece." In the late 1980's and early 1990's, Trajkovic was Milosevic's close collaborator in the campaign of abolishing Kosovo's autonomy. This campaign was one of the main levers in Milosevic's political rise in which the Serbs from Kosovo played the crucial role.

The Serbian Unity Party (SSJ) of Zeljko Raznatovic-Arkan, which is rather influential among the Kosovo Serbs, described Despic's statement as "anti-Serb and anti-Yugoslav." The SSJ speaker, Borislav Pelevic said that Despic's statement came "at the worst moment," at the time when the international community conditions the abolition of the sanctions by the status of minorities. The Democratic Party (DS) and the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) also criticized Despic, adding that Kosovo is "an integral part of Serbia" and must remain such.

Serbia: Academician Speaks in Favor of Partitioning Kosovo

LD1206174496 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1321 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 12 Jun (SRNA)—Academician Ljubomir Tadic said today it is high time the increasingly topical issue of Kosovo-Metohija is resolved because the situation is becoming increasingly complex.

"The statement by Aleksandar Despic, president of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, is not an argument which should be rejected, as it has its purpose and meaning," Academician Tadic told SRNA.

"This is a basic idea which should be used as the starting point, since developments and the critical situation in Kosovo can no longer be neglected and glossed over," he said adding:

"We have been, and we indeed are, exposed to a demographic expansion—therefore it is necessary to cut the Gordian knot. Despic's statement is only an introduction to a serious discussion which cannot be postponed."

According to Tadic, "the pompous ceremony of opening the U.S. Information Center in Pristina, where U.S. Assistant Secretary of State John Kornblum made a speech favorable to the Albanians, is yet another huge concession made by the Serbian authorities."

"This is part and parcel of a consistent policy of continuously giving up territory. Therefore, I think that in his statement Despic highlights the overall situation, i.e. the problem which can no longer wait," Tadic concluded.

Serbia: Commissioner for Refugees Meets OSCE Officials

LD1206190496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1617 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 12 (TANJUG)—Serbian Commissioner for Refugees Bratislava Morina received here on Wednesday Adviser to the President of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Hans Peter Kleiner and Vice-Chairman of the OSCE Provisional Electoral Commission for Bosnia-Herzegovina Sir Kenneth Scott.

The OSCE delegation wanted to know how refugees in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will be voting in the planned Bosnian elections (to be organized under the auspices of the OSCE) and offered financial and logistic assistance, Morina's office said in a statement.

Morina expressed confidence that competent Yugoslav bodies will do everything to enable the refugees in the Yugoslav territory to cast ballot.

Morina informed the OSCE officials that registration of refugees, conducted in cooperation with the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, had just been concluded in the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia. She said the information would be invaluable in preparations for the elections in Bosnia.

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Serbia: Ljajic Predicts 'Massive' Bosniak Election Turnout

AU0906154096 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1020 GMT 9 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Kragujevac, 9 Jun (BETA)—Rasim Ljajic, president of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] of Sandzak, stated that the majority of the political parties that pool the Muslims of Sandzak agree on the need to participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections.

"I expect a massive response by the Bosniak people and the voters at these elections in view of the fact that we abstained from the previous three elections," Ljajic said in the Hallmark of Time Radio Kragujevac program.

He assessed that "a sort of political mistake was made by nonparticipation in the elections."

"In a democratic procedure we will strive to safeguard the conditions for the restoration of trust among the ethnic communities which live in Sandzak," Ljajic said.

He emphasized that the interest of the Sandzak Muslims was the formation "of a joint Bosniak list regardless of all differences that exist among individual political groups and parties that are active in Sandzak; however, the SDA was also bracing for an independent run in the elections."

This is one of the ways that the Sandzak Muslims realize their political goals although "this does not mean that the position of the Bosniaks in Yugoslavia will improve dramatically with the participation itself; however, in any case it creates a wider maneuvering space for the political activity," Ljajic added.

Serbia: Social Democrats Say SDU Only Alternative to SPS

AU0906152496 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1350 GMT 8 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 8 June (BETA)—Serbia needs a party that advocates democracy, pluralism, economic reforms, tolerance in society, and internal party dialogue, which is the sort of party like the Social Democratic Union (SDU), the representatives of this newly formed party said today.

MP Zarko Korac, one of the party founders, stated at the meeting of the Belgrade Circle that SDU was the only true alternative to the regime and the creator of the new option for Serbia.

"The existing opposition is not an alternative to the regime, but merely its uglier face. These parties are leader-oriented, undemocratic, and authoritarian; they are forging coalitions which fall apart overnight; and they are politically immature," Korac said.

He believes that the opposition failed to comprehend that Milosevic's regime did not survive merely thanks to the control of the media, police, the economy, and its nationalist ideology, but also because the ruling party asserted itself as the bearer of continuity with the former, Communist regime, however, only in its positive aspects.

"There have been aspects of this system that the people embraced over the past 45 years, judging them positive, for example, the social security and free education," Korac said.

The SDU is offering an idea of a mixed society to the citizens, for example, that "the left does not need to be necessarily totalitarian and undemocratic," and "is compelling Serbia to reflect on the meaning of democracy, pluralism, and tolerance as more than mere words," Korac said.

He added that the one who mustered the courage to stand up "against the crowd that was calling for blood and war" will need an equal amount of courage and intelligence to carry through a political project such as the Social Democratic idea.

"Europe should be introduced in Serbia with the correct European ideas and not by bringing back the king, as was suggested at the opposition parties' rally in Kraljevo," Korac said.

He accused some of the opposition parties of going full circle from superficial democrats, ultranationalists, and war mongers, to overnight peace lovers.

"Some of them supported Radovan Karadzic a lot longer that the ruling party did. A democratic and new Serbia cannot be created by the people like this," Korac assessed. (passage omitted)

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Serbia: Printing House Refuses To Print SRPSKA REC

AU1206163696 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 12 Jun 96 p 24

[Report by M.K.P.: "BIGZ Refuses To Print SRPSKA REC"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade—The Board of Directors of the Belgrade Publishing and Graphics Institute [BIGZ] has decided to stop printing SRPSKA REC, the paper's director Danica Draskovic told NASA BORBA last night, adding that the paper was supposed to be printed today.

I was informed about this by telephone, and when I demanded an explanation, as we have already paid for the printing in advance and obtained and stored the newsprint for the next four issues, I was told that the reason was that we had insulted Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and his family. It is true that this issue contains an article on the illegal construction of a house for Marko Milosevic on somebody else's lot in Pozarevac, and our cover shot shows Marko [Milosevic] leading a drunken calf. The photo was taken at the recent opening of his club, Madona, Mrs. Draskovic claims.

According to her, she asked to be received by [Information] Minister Aleksandar Tijanic, who agreed to see her if she had a written decision from the BIGZ Board of Directors.

Montenegro

Montenegro: Cabinet Issues Statement on Talks With Clinton

AU1206195596 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1749 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Podgorica, 12 June (BETA)—The cabinet of Montenegrin Prime Minister Mile Djukanovic reported today that, during his visit to the United States, Djukanovic met with that country's President Bill Clinton on 10 June.

Djukanovic, who visited the United States "at the initiative of U.S.-Montenegrin business," exchanged views with Clinton on the realization of the peace plan for Bosnia and other issues of importance for the stability in the region, the statement claims.

It is a joint belief that the imminent democratic elections in Bosnia will consolidate the peace in Bosnia and create the conditions for faster democratic and economic development in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In the United States, Djukanovic also met with that country's Secretary of Trade Mickey Cantor and, during the working visit, also held numerous successful business talks with the representatives of U.S. corporations interested in the Montenegrin market, the statement by the cabinet of the Montenegrin prime minister reports.

Kosovo

Kosovo: General Says Kosovo Rumors Aimed at 'Defeatism'

LD1206194396 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1639 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Pristina, 12 Jun (TANJUG)—On the occasion of Yugoslav Army Day (16th June), Lieutenant Colonel General Milovan Bojovic, commander of the Pristina Corps, today received parents and family members of soldiers and officers of the Yugoslav People's Army who were killed in the 1990-92 war. [passage omitted]

General Bojovic also commented on speculation about the future of Kosovo-Metohija, and said the purpose of these rumors is to engender defeatism among our people.

Kosovo: UNHCR Reports 19,000 Serb Refugees Now in Province

AU1106085596 Tirana ATA in English 1822 GMT 10 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 10 (ATA)—According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, there are 19,000 Serb refugees in Kosova, the Kosova Information Center reports.

The coordinator of the department for UNHCR special operations in former Yugoslavia, Rene van Rujen, has declared that there are more than 500,000-600,000 refugees in self-style Yugoslavia. The UNHCR has allocated some $60 million for them.

The representative says that some 200,000 refugees have been established in Vojvodina and 19,000 in Kosova.

Serb representatives in Belgrade stated some time ago that, according to the latest registration, there are 17,000 refugees in Kosova.

Kosova, until it was detached from the national body by decision of the Ambassadors' Conference in London in 1913, had been an undivided part of Albania. Actually, over 90 per cent of its population is Albanian. The establishment of Serb refugee camps is one among the numerous measures undertaken by Serbs to colonise Kosova.

The Albanian leaders in Kosova have criticised this action because Kosova is the region with the largest population among the regions of former Yugoslavia.

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